Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his 
individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." 

Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167, 172(1960) An agent of the government who is abusing his position or the power conferred upon him is still acting under the “color of law” and is thus subject to §1983 actions.” 

Hagans v Lavine 415 U. S. 533. “A judgment rendered by a court without personal jurisdiction over the defendant is void. It is a nullity.”  

Sramek v. Sramek, 17 Kan. App 2d 573, 576-7, 840 P. 2d 553 (1992) rev. denied 252 Kan. 1093(1993) “The law provides that once State and Federal jurisdiction has been challenged, it musts be proven.”  

Main v Thiboutot, 100 S Ct. 2502(1980) “Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time,” and “Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided.”  

Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co. 395 F 2d 906, 910 “Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, it must be proved to exist.”  

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958). "No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it."  The constitutional theory is that we the people are the sovereigns, the state and federal officials only our agents." "The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for the mere privilege of existing. The corporation is an artificial entity which owes its existence and charter powers to the state; but the individual's rights to live and own property are natural rights for the enjoyment of which an excise cannot be imposed." 

Redfield v Fisher, 292 P 813, at 819 [1930] "...an officer may be held liable in damages to any person injured in consequence of a breach of any of the duties connected with his office...The liability for nonfeasance, misfeasance, and for malfeasance in office is in his 'individual', not his official capacity..."  

70 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 50, VII Civil Liability “Fraud destroys the validity of everything into which it enters,” 

Nudd et al. v. Burrows, Assignee, 91 U.S. 426 (1875). “Fraud vitiates everything” 

Boyce's Executors vs. Grundy, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 210 (1830) "Fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents  
and even judgments." 

United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878) WHEREAS, officials and even judges have no immunity (See, Owen vs. City of Independence, 100 S Ct. 1398;  Maine vs. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502; and Hafer vs. Melo, 502 U.S. 21; officials and judges are deemed to know the law and sworn to uphold the law; officials and judges cannot claim to act in good faith in willful deprivation of law, they certainly cannot plead ignorance of the law, even the Citizen cannot plead ignorance of the law, the courts have ruled there is no such thing as ignorance of the law, it is ludicrous for learned officials and judges to plead ignorance of the law therefore there is no immunity, judicial or otherwise, in matters of rights secured by the Constitution for the United States of America. See: Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. "When lawsuits are brought against federal officials, they must be brought against them in their "individual" capacity not their official capacity. When federal officials perpetrate constitutional torts, they do so ultra vires (beyond the powers) and lose the shield of immunity."  

Williamson v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 815 F.2d. 368, ACLU Foundation v. Barr, 952 F.2d. 457, 293 U.S. App. DC 101, (CA DC 1991). "It is the duty of all officials whether legislative, judicial, executive, administrative, or ministerial to so perform every official act as not to violate constitutional provisions." 

Stock v. Medical Examiners 94 Ca 2d 751. 211 P2d 289 In Interest of M.V., 288 Ill.App.3d 300, 681 N.E.2d 532 (1st Dist. 1997) "Where a court's power to act is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction, and courts exercising jurisdiction over such matters must proceed within the structures of the statute."

Roadway Express v. Pipe, 447 U.S. 752 at 757 (1982) "Due to sloth, inattention or desire to seize tactical advantage, lawyers have long engaged in dilatory practices... the glacial pace of much litigation breeds frustration with the Federal Courts and ultimately, disrespect for the law." 

“Fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents and even judgments,” United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878).

“Fraud may consist in the concealment of what is true as well as the assertion of what is false where the concealment is shown to have been done with the intention to deceive under circumstances creating an opportunity and duty to speak.” In re Marriage of Richardson, 237 Ill.App.3d 1067, 606 N.E.2d 56, 67; 179 Ill.Dec. 224, 235 (1st Dist.1992). Concealment of an existing material fact is actionable where employed as a device to mislead. Chapman v. Hosek, 131 Ill.App.3d 180, 475 N.E.2d 593, 598; 86 Ill.Dec. 379, 384 (1st Dist.1985). Fraud is the intentional misrepresentation of a material fact or the concealment of a fact which induces a party to rely on that misrepresentation to his or her detriment. In re Marriage of Gurin, 212 Ill.App.3d 806, 571 N.E.2d 857, 862; 156 Ill.Dec. 877, 882 (1st Dist.1991). Silence alone does not generally constitute a misrepresentation. Russow v. Bobola, 2 Ill.App.3d 837, 277 N.E.2d 769 (2d Dist.1972). However, when the opportunity and duty to speak exists, deceptive conduct or the suppression of material facts is involved, and the injured party would have acted differently absent the other party's silence, such silence may constitute either misrepresentation or concealment. Heider v. Leewards Creative Crafts, Inc., 245 Ill.App.3d 258, 613 N.E.2d 805, 184 Ill.Dec. 488 (2d Dist.1993); In re Marriage of Richardson, 237 Ill.App.3d 1067, 606 N.E.2d 56, 179 Ill.Dec. 224 (1st Dist.1992). In cases involving such fraudulent behavior, the distinction between concealment and affirmative misrepresentation is tenuous. Lindsey v. Edgar, 129 Ill.App.3d 718, 473 N.E.2d 92, 84 Ill.Dec. 876 (4th Dist.1984). 

See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 233 (West 1987); First Nat'l Bank in Durant v. Honey Creek Entm't Corp., 54 P.3d 100, 104 (Okla. 2002) ("Fraud vitiates everything it touches, and a contract obtained thereby is voidable.") (citing Bredouw v. Jones, 431 P.2d 413, 419 (Okla. 1966)); Dusbabek v. Bowers, 43 P.2d 97 (Okla. 1934); In re Tirey Distrib. Co., 242 B.R. 717, 721 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1999) ("A party may rescind a contract if his consent to such contract is obtained by fraud. ")

Illinois courts have consistently held that the elements of a claim for fraudulent concealment are the same as the elements for a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. Intentional concealment is said to be the equivalent of a false statement of material fact. Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 156 Ill.App.3d 154, 510 N.E.2d 409, 413; 109 Ill.Dec. 541, 545 (1st Dist.1986). 

Violations of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice Act include the use of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or concealment of facts in the conduct of trade or commerce. 815 ILCS 505/2. A defendant's good faith in making a representation to another is irrelevant; even an innocent misrepresentation is actionable. Duran v. Leslie Oldsmobile, Inc., 229 Ill. App. 3d 1032 (1992). See also Priebe v. Autobarn, Ltd., 240 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2001).

Justifiable reliance is an element of the tort of fraud and deceit. Gerill v. Jack L. Hargrove Builders, 128 Ill.2d 179, 538 N.E.2d 530, 536; 131 Ill.Dec. 155, 161 (1989). The expression “justifiable reliance” is thought to be synonymous with the expression “reasonable reliance,” and in fact some courts use each expression in the same opinion. Central States Joint Board v. Continental Assurance Co., 117 Ill.App.3d 600, 453 N.E.2d 932, 935-937, 73 Ill.Dec. 107, 110-112 (1st Dist.1983); Warner v. Lucas, 185 Ill.App.3d 351, 541 N.E.2d 705, 706; 133 Ill.Dec. 494, 495 (5th Dist.1989) (reasonably believed and justifiably relied upon)

In a fraud action, it is error to give a version of IPI 35.01 which substitutes the words “fraud and deceit” for the words “willful and wanton.” Home Savings & Loan Association v. Schneider, 108 Ill.2d 277, 483 N.E.2d 1225, 1228; 91 Ill.Dec. 590, 593 (1985). Punitive damages may not be awarded solely upon a finding of fraud without requiring willful and wanton conduct. Id. The court in Schneider relied on Laughlin v. Hopkinson, 292 Ill. 80, 89; 126 N.E. 591, 594 (1920), which held that in a deceit action, punitive damages may be allowed where the wrong involves some violation of duty springing from a relationship of trust or confidence, or where the fraud is gross, or the case presents other extraordinary or exceptional circumstances clearly showing malice and willfulness.

fraud vitiates everything which it touches" (Angerosa v White Co., 248 App. Div. 425, 431, affd.... 944; 5 Williston, Contracts [3d ed], § 725); but any relinquishment of the option to dismiss induced by such deceit and device as to constitute fraud would be ineffective and not binding, as...and actionable as where fraud induces positive action (Stern Bros. v New York Edison Co., 251 App. Div. 379, 381)

"fraud vitiates everything it touches." Italian Cowboy Partners v. Prudential Ins. Co., 341 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. 2011)

See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 233 (West 1987); First Nat'l Bank in Durant v. Honey Creek Entm't Corp., 54 P.3d 100, 104 (Okla. 2002) ("Fraud vitiates everything it touches, and a contract obtained thereby is voidable.") (citing Bredouw v. Jones, 431 P.2d 413, 419 (Okla. 1966)); Dusbabek v. Bowers, 43 P.2d 97 (Okla. 1934); In re Tirey Distrib. Co., 242 B.R. 717, 721 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1999) ("A party may rescind a contract if his consent to such contract is obtained by fraud. ").

The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the plaintiff but rather to punish the defendant and to serve as a deterrent. Punitive damages can only be awarded for conduct involving some element of outrage similar to that usually found in crime. Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 138 Ill.2d 404, 563 N.E.2d 397, 401; 150 Ill.Dec. 510, 514 (1990). 

The elements of a private cause of action under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice Act are: (1) a deceptive/fraudulent act or practice by the defendant; (2) the defendant intended the plaintiff to rely on the deception/fraud; (3) the deception/fraud occurred in the course of conduct involving trade or commerce; and (4) actual damages to the plaintiff proximately caused by the deception/fraud.

One federal statute defines commerce as: “the exchanging, buying, or selling of things having economic value between two or more entities, for example goods, services, and money. Commerce is often done on a large scale, typically between individuals, businesses, or nations.” See: 15 U.S.C. §1127

 In law, proximately means in a way that directly causes damage, loss, or injury to someone.

(735 ILCS 5/1-109) (from Ch. 110, par. 1-109) 
   Sec. 1-109. Verification by certification. Unless otherwise expressly provided by rule of the Supreme Court, whenever in this Code any complaint, petition, answer, reply, bill of particulars, answer to interrogatories, affidavit, return or proof of service, or other document or pleading filed in any court of this State is required or permitted to be verified, or made, sworn to or verified under oath, such requirement or permission is hereby defined to include a certification of such pleading, affidavit or other document under penalty of perjury as provided in this Section. 
   Whenever any such pleading, affidavit or other document is so certified, the several matters stated shall be stated positively or upon information and belief only, according to the fact. The person or persons having knowledge of the matters stated in a pleading, affidavit or other document certified in accordance with this Section shall subscribe to a certification in substantially the following form: Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to such matters the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he verily believes the same to be true.

Any pleading, affidavit, or other document certified in accordance with this Section may be used in the same manner and with the same force and effect as though subscribed and sworn to under oath, and there is no further requirement that the pleading, affidavit, or other document be sworn before an authorized person. 
   Any person who makes a false statement, material to the issue or point in question, which he does not believe to be true, in any pleading, affidavit or other document certified by such person in accordance with this Section shall be guilty of a Class 3 felony. 
(Source: P.A. 100-1086, eff. 1-1-19.) 

Rule 137 - Signing of Pleadings, Motions and Other Documents-Sanctions 
  (a) Signature requirement/certification. Every pleading, motion and other document of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other document and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other document; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other document is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other document is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other document, including a reasonable attorney fee.(b)Procedure for Alleging Violations of This Rule. All proceedings under this rule shall be brought within the civil action in which the pleading, motion or other document referred to has been filed, and no violation or alleged violation of this rule shall give rise to a separate civil suit, but shall be considered a claim within the same civil action. Motions brought pursuant to this rule must be filed within 30 days of the entry of final judgment, or if a timely post-judgment motion is filed, within 30 days of the ruling on the post-judgment motion.(c)Applicability to State Entities and Review of Administrative Determinations. This rule shall apply to the State of Illinois or any agency of the State in the same manner as any other party. Furthermore, where the litigation involves review of a determination of an administrative agency, the court may include in its award for expenses an amount to compensate a party for costs actually incurred by that party in contesting on the administrative level an allegation or denial made by the State without reasonable cause and found to be untrue.(d) Required Written Explanation of Imposition of Sanctions. Where a sanction is imposed under this rule, the judge shall set forth with specificity the reasons and basis of any sanction so imposed either in the judgment order itself or in a separate written order.(e) Attorney Assistance Not Requiring an Appearance or Signature. An attorney may assist a self-represented person in drafting or reviewing a pleading, motion, or other document without making a general or limited scope appearance. Such assistance does not constitute either a general or limited scope appearance by the attorney. The self-represented person shall sign the pleading, motion, or other paper. An attorney providing drafting or reviewing assistance may rely on the self represented person's representation of facts without further investigation by the attorney, unless the attorney knows that such representations are false. 

In Parsons v. Winter, 142 Ill.App.3d 354, 491 N.E.2d 1236, 1240; 96 Ill.Dec. 776, 780 (1st Dist.1986), the court held that a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant made a statement of a material nature (as opposed to opinion); that the statement was untrue; and that the statement was known or believed to be untrue by the person making it, or made in culpable ignorance of its truth or falsity. To the same effect is Gordon v. Dolin, 105 Ill.App.3d 319, 434 N.E.2d 341, 345; 61 Ill.Dec. 188, 192 (1st Dist.1982). The court did not suggest an enhanced burden of proof with regard to the other elements 

To be “material” the representation must relate to a matter upon which the plaintiff could be expected to rely in determining to engage in the conduct in question. McPherson v. Hewitt, 32 Ill.App.3d 435, 443; 335 N.E.2d 606, 612 (2d Dist.1975). It may not be an opinion (Davis v. Nehf, 14 Ill.App.3d 318, 302 N.E.2d 382 (1st Dist.1973)), nor a promise of future action (Polivka v. Worth Dairy, Inc., 26 Ill.App.3d 961, 328 N.E.2d 350 (1st Dist.1974)).  

It may be actionable even if the misrepresentation was not the sole inducement (Hicks v. Stevens, 121 Ill. 186, 11 N.E. 241 (1887)).  

A misrepresentation is “material” and therefore actionable if it is such that had the other party been aware of it, the party would have acted differently. Perlman v. Time, Inc., 64 Ill.App.3d 190, 197; 380 N.E.2d 1040, 1045; 20 Ill.Dec. 831, 836 (1st Dist.1978). The misrepresented condition must be an essential element to the transaction between the parties. Mack v. Plaza Dewitt Limited Partnership, 137 Ill.App.3d 343, 484 N.E.2d 900, 906; 92 Ill.Dec. 169, 175 (1st Dist.1985) 

Under Illinois law, the elements of a claim for tortious interference with business relationships, more commonly called tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, are that: • The plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of entering into or continuing a valid business relationship with a third party. • The defendant knew of that expectation. • The defendant intentionally and without justification interfered with that expectation. • The defendant’s interference prevented the plaintiff’s legitimate expectancy from ripening into a valid business relationship (Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 483-84 (1998)). • The plaintiff suffered damages because of the interference. (Voyles v. Sandia Mortg. Corp., 196 Ill. 2d 288, 300-01 (2001).) Courts and litigants in Illinois also refer to this claim as tortious interference with business expectancy.

Under Illinois law, the elements of a claim for tortious interference with a contract are that: • The plaintiff and a third party entered into a valid and enforceable contract. • The defendant knew of the contract. • The defendant intentionally and unjustifiably induced the third party to breach the contract. • The defendant’s wrongful conduct caused the third party to breach the contract. • The plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the breach of the contract. (HPI Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 145, 154-55 (1989).) Courts and litigants in Illinois sometimes refer to a tortious interference with contract claim as a claim for either: • Tortious interference with contractual relations. • Tortious interference with contractual business relationships

CONSUMER FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ACT

The Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ("Act"), 815 ILCS 505/1, et seq., is comprehensive legislation designed to protect .... against fraud or deceptive practices in the conduct of trade or business.

The Act provides for civil and criminal liability, and a private cause of action to all persons who suffer damage as a result of a violation of the Act. Ashkanazy v. I. Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1527 (1977); Bank One Milwaukee v. Sanchez, 336 Ill. App. 3d 319 (2d Dist. 2003)

Violations of the Act include the use of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or concealment of facts in the conduct of trade or commerce. 815 ILCS 505/2.  

A defendant's good faith in making a representation to another is irrelevant; even an innocent misrepresentation is actionable. Duran v. Leslie Oldsmobile, Inc., 229 Ill. App. 3d 1032 (1992). See also Priebe v. Autobarn, Ltd., 240 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2001).

The elements of a private cause of action under the Act are: (1) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant; (2) the defendant intended the plaintiff to rely on the deception; (3) the deception occurred in the course of conduct involving trade or commerce; and (4) actual damages to the plaintiff proximately caused by the deception

One federal statute defines commerce as: “the exchanging, buying, or selling of things having economic value between two or more entities, for example goods, services, and money.  Commerce is often done on a large scale, typically between individuals, businesses, or nations.”   See: 15 U.S.C. §1127

For this reason, the committee has prepared two burden of proof instructions. IPI 800.02A was prepared for use in those cases where the trial court rules that only the first and second propositions of IPI 800.02A must be proved by clear and convincing evidence and the remaining elements require only proof by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence.

The expression “clear and convincing” has sometimes been defined in terms of “reasonable doubt.” However, such a definition seems to lack clarity and could easily be confused with criminal matters in the minds of a jury. Definitions are discussed in the case of Parsons v. Winter, 142 Ill.App.3d 354, 491 N.E.2d 1236, 1240; 96 Ill.Dec. 776, 780 (1st Dist.1986). That court, after discussing a definition of “clear and convincing” which included the words “reasonable doubt,” concluded that “highly probably true” would be a clearer statement of the concept. The court also relied on In re Estate of Ragen, 79 Ill.App.3d 8, 13-14; 398 N.E.2d 198, 202-203; 34 Ill.Dec. 523, 527-528 (1st Dist.1979). The committee considered both the terms “reasonable doubt” and “highly probably true.” The conclusion the committee reached is that the expression “clear and convincing” is more understandable than any definition that could be framed using “reasonable doubt” or “highly probably true.” The expression “clear and convincing” contains terms which are readily understandable and in common every day usage, and an effort to define those terms might very well create confusion and misunderstanding

The Illinois Supreme Court has not defined the term “material.” In Foster v. Oberreich, 230 Ill. 525, 82 N.E. 858 (1907), the court stated that the representation must be “calculated and intended to influence the plaintiff.” To be “material” the representation must relate to a matter upon which the plaintiff could be expected to rely in determining to engage in the conduct in question. McPherson v. Hewitt, 32 Ill.App.3d 435, 443; 335 N.E.2d 606, 612 (2d Dist.1975). It may not be an opinion (Davis v. Nehf, 14 Ill.App.3d 318, 302 N.E.2d 382 (1st Dist.1973)), nor a promise of future action (Polivka v. Worth Dairy, Inc., 26 Ill.App.3d 961, 328 N.E.2d 350 (1st Dist.1974)). It may be actionable even if the misrepresentation was not the sole inducement (Hicks v. Stevens, 121 Ill. 186, 11 N.E. 241 (1887)). A misrepresentation is “material” and therefore actionable if it is such that had the other party been aware of it, the party would have acted differently. Perlman v. Time, Inc., 64 Ill.App.3d 190, 197; 380 N.E.2d 1040, 1045; 20 Ill.Dec. 831, 836 (1st Dist.1978). The misrepresented condition must be an essential element to the transaction between the parties. Mack v. Plaza Dewitt Limited Partnership, 137 Ill.App.3d 343, 484 N.E.2d 900, 906; 92 Ill.Dec. 169, 175 (1st Dist.1985)

In addition to actual damages, certain consequential damages proximately resulting from the fraud are recoverable. Home Savings & Loan Association v. Schneider, 127 Ill.App.3d 689, 469 N.E.2d 585, 589; 82 Ill.Dec. 941, 945 (3d Dist.1984), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 108 Ill.2d 277, 483 N.E.2d 1225, 91 Ill.Dec. 590 (1985); Tan v. Boyke, 156 Ill.App.3d 49, 508 N.E.2d 390, 394; 108 Ill.Dec. 229, 233 (2d Dist.1987); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 549 (1977) (in a business transaction, additional damages to give plaintiff the benefit of his or her bargain may be recovered if properly proved). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 549(1) (b) (1977) (expenses incurred in preparing to use property in a manner the defendant has represented as appropriate are recoverable)

(720 ILCS 5/17-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 17-1) 
   Sec. 17-1. Deceptive practices. 
(A) General deception. 
   A person commits a deceptive practice when, with intent to defraud, the person does any of the following: 
       (1) He or she knowingly causes another, by deception, or threat, to execute a document disposing of property or a document by which a pecuniary obligation is incurred. 

(720 ILCS 5/17-13) 
   Sec. 17-13. Fraud in transfers of real and personal property. 
   (a) Conditional sale; sale without consent of title holder. No person purchasing personal property under a conditional sales contract shall, during the existence of such conditional sales contract and before the conditions thereof have been fulfilled, knowingly sell, transfer, conceal, or in any manner dispose of such property, or cause or allow the same to be done, without the written consent of the holder of title. 
   (b) Acknowledgment of fraudulent conveyance. No officer authorized to take the proof and acknowledgment of a conveyance of real or personal property or other instrument shall knowingly certify that the conveyance or other instrument was duly proven or acknowledged by a party to the conveyance or other instrument when no such acknowledgment or proof was made, or was not made at the time it was certified to have been made, with intent to injure or defraud or to enable any other person to injure or defraud. 
      (d) Sentence. A violation of subsection (a) of this Section is a Class A misdemeanor. A violation of subsection (b) of this Section is a Class 4 felony. A violation of subsection (c) of this Section is a Class 3 felony. 
(Source: P.A. 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11.)

(625 ILCS 5/3-114) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 3-114) 
   Sec. 3-114. Transfer by operation of law. 
   (a) If the interest of an owner in a vehicle passes to another other than by voluntary transfer, the transferee shall, except as provided in paragraph (b), promptly mail or deliver within 20 days to the Secretary of State the last certificate of title, if available, proof of the transfer, and his application for a new certificate in the form the Secretary of State prescribes. It shall be unlawful for any person having possession of a certificate of title for a motor vehicle, semi-trailer, or house car by reason of his having a lien or encumbrance on such vehicle, to fail or refuse to deliver such certificate to the owner, upon the satisfaction or discharge of the lien or encumbrance, indicated upon such certificate of title. 

(720 ILCS 5/17-24) 
   Sec. 17-24. Mail fraud and wire fraud. 
   (a) Mail fraud. A person commits mail fraud when he or she: 
       (1) devises or intends to devise any scheme or, artifice to defraud, or to obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such a counterfeit or spurious article; and

       (2) with the intent to execute such scheme or, artifice or to attempt to do so, does any of the following:

           (A) Places in any post office or authorized, depository for mail matter within this State any matter or thing to be delivered by the United States Postal Service, according to the direction on the matter or thing.

(D) Knowingly causes any such matter or thing to, be delivered by mail or by private or commercial carrier, according to the direction on the matter or thing. 

(720 ILCS 5/17-50) (was 720 ILCS 5/16D-5 and 5/16D-6) 
   Sec. 17-50. Computer fraud. 
   (a) A person commits computer fraud when he or she knowingly: 
       (1) Accesses or causes to be accessed a computer or, any part thereof, or a program or data, with the intent of devising or executing any scheme or artifice to defraud, or as part of a deception;

(2) Obtains use of, damages, or destroys a computer, or any part thereof, or alters, deletes, or removes any program or data contained therein, in connection with any scheme or artifice to defraud, or as part of a deception; or

(3) Accesses or causes to be accessed a computer or, any part thereof, or a program or data, and obtains money or control over any such money, property, or services of another in connection with any scheme or artifice to defraud, or as part of a deception.   

(720 ILCS 5/17-56) (was 720 ILCS 5/16-1.3)

   Sec. 17-56. Financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability.  

(a) A person commits financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability when he or she stands in a position of trust or confidence with the elderly person or a person with a disability and he or she knowingly:

       (1) by deception or intimidation obtains control over the property of an elderly person or a person with a disability; or

       (2) illegally uses the assets or resources of an elderly person or a person with a disability.

   (c) For purposes of this Section:

       (1) "Elderly person" means a person 60 years of age or older.

       (2) "Person with a disability" means a person who suffers from a physical or mental impairment resulting from disease, injury, functional disorder or congenital condition that impairs the individual's mental or physical ability to independently manage his or her property or financial resources, or both.

       (4) "Deception" means, in addition to its meaning as defined in Section 15-4 of this Code, a misrepresentation or concealment of material fact relating to the terms of a contract or agreement entered into with the elderly person or person with a disability or to the existing or pre-existing condition of any of the property involved in such contract or agreement; or the use or employment of any misrepresentation, false pretense or false promise in order to induce, encourage or solicit the elderly person or person with a disability to enter into a contract or agreement.

   The illegal use of the assets or resources of an elderly person or a person with a disability includes, but is not limited to, the misappropriation of those assets or resources by undue influence, breach of a fiduciary relationship, fraud, deception, extortion, or use of the assets or resources contrary to law.

   A person stands in a position of trust and confidence with an elderly person or person with a disability when he (i) is a parent, spouse, adult child or other relative by blood or marriage of the elderly person or person with a disability, (ii) is a joint tenant or tenant in common with the elderly person or person with a disability, (iii) has a legal or fiduciary relationship with the elderly person or person with a disability, (iv) is a financial planning or investment professional, (v) is a paid or unpaid caregiver for the elderly person or person with a disability, or (vi) is a friend or acquaintance in a position of trust.

   (d) Limitations. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit the remedies available to the victim under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.

   (e) Good faith efforts. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to impose criminal liability on a person who has made a good faith effort to assist the elderly person or person with a disability in the management of his or her property, but through no fault of his or her own has been unable to provide such assistance.

   (f) Not a defense. It shall not be a defense to financial exploitation of an elderly person or person with a disability that the accused reasonably believed that the victim was not an elderly person or person with a disability. Consent is not a defense to financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability if the accused knew or had reason to know that the elderly person or a person with a disability lacked capacity to consent.

   (g) Civil Liability. A civil cause of action exists for financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability as described in subsection (a) of this Section. A person against whom a civil judgment has been entered for financial exploitation of an elderly person or person with a disability shall be liable to the victim or to the estate of the victim in damages of treble the amount of the value of the property obtained, plus reasonable attorney fees and court costs. In a civil action under this subsection, the burden of proof that the defendant committed financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability as described in subsection (a) of this Section shall be by a preponderance of the evidence. This subsection shall be operative whether or not the defendant has been charged or convicted of the criminal offense as described in subsection (a) of this Section. This subsection (g) shall not limit or affect the right of any person to bring any cause of action or seek any remedy available under the common law, or other applicable law, arising out of the financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability.

   (h) If a person is charged with financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability that involves the taking or loss of property valued at more than $5,000, a prosecuting attorney may file a petition with the circuit court of the county in which the defendant has been charged to freeze the assets of the defendant in an amount equal to but not greater than the alleged value of lost or stolen property in the defendant's pending criminal proceeding for purposes of restitution to the victim. The burden of proof required to freeze the defendant's assets shall be by a preponderance of the evidence. 

While fraud otherwise need be established only by a preponderance of the evidence, the remedy of rescis
sion requires “clear and convincing evidence.” Weise v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 175 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Minn. 1970); 
Bolander v. Bolander, 703 N.W.2d 529, 541 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). “Clear and convincing evidence” is more than 
a preponderance, “but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.” Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. 
1978).

An alleged victim of fraud must act diligently and promptly in seeking to rescind. Clark v. Reddick, 
791 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Minn. 2010); Hemming v. Ald, Inc., 155 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Minn. 1967) (citing principles of 
waiver, laches, and estoppel); Johns v. McGenty, 23 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Minn. 1946) (“The power of avoidance from 
fraud or misrepresentation is lost if, after acquiring knowledge thereof, the injured party unreasonably delays mani
festing to the other party his intention to avoid the transaction.”); Everson v. J.L. Owens Mfg. Co., 176 N.W. 505, 
506–07 (Minn. 1920) (the defrauded party “cannot sleep on his rights, but must be reasonably diligent in seeking his 
remedy, and if he delays beyond a reasonable time, his right to rescind is lost”).

A plaintiff waives the right to rescind if, after discovering the alleged fraud, the plaintiff chooses to perform 
the contract and accept its benefits. Proulx v. Hirsch, 155 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Minn. 1968); Carpenter v. Vreeman, 
409 N.W.2d 258, 261–62 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); see also Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Anderson, 253 N.W. 885, 887 
(Minn. 1934) (“defrauded parties cannot disaffirm a contract after having affirmed it with knowledge of the fraud”). 
“To establish a waiver or ratification of fraud, there must be evidence that the waiving party had full knowledge of 
the facts and his or her legal rights, and intended to relinquish these rights.” Carpenter, 409 N.W.2d at 262.

Negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation share many common elements. “We have said in the past that negli
gent misrepresentation constitutes fraud.” Hardin Cnty. Sav. Bank v. Housing & Redevelopment Auth. of the City of 
Brainerd, 821 N.W.2d 184, 191 (Minn. 2012) (citing Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lebowsky, 252 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 
1977)).

There are important differences, however. Chiefly, to be liable for negligent misrepresentation, the defendant 
need act only negligently, and not dishonestly or in bad faith. See Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 173 (Minn. 
1986)