In the Circuit Court of Sangamon County 

Seventh Judicial District 

Plaintiff 1 , Plaintiff 2,                                                                              ) 

Plaintiffs,                                                                                              )               Case No. 2022-LA-000169 

V.                                                                                                               ) 

Minor, Parent 1,                                                                                   )  

Parent 2,                                                                                               ) 

Defendants,                                                                                        ) 

TWELFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT AT LAW 

NOW COME the Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2, and complain of the Defendants Minor, Parent 1, and Parent 2, upon personal information as to their own activities and upon information and belief as to the activities of others and all other matters, and states as follows: 

NATURE OF ACTION 

Due to the nature of the alleged offenses, many civil causes of action are relevant to this complaint. 

Count I is an action against Minor for Negligence in her operation of a motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/11-601) that resulted in physical injury. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek Actual Compensatory Damages, General Compensatory Damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 1, 35-233, 234-239, 346-370) 

Count II is an action against Minor for Negligence in her operation of a motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/11-601) that resulted in personal property damage. By this action, Plaintiff, Plaintiff 2 seeks actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiff in connection with this action. (Lines 2, 35-233, 234-239, 346-370) 

Count III is an action against Parent 2 for Neglect in her Duties as a Medical Personal Representative for Minor and Negligence in Not Enforcing Medical Restrictions upon Minor (705 ILCS 405/2-3) (720 ILCS 5/4-6) (720 ILCS 5/4-7) while a minor she was responsible for and for allowing said individual to drive any vehicle while said individual could no longer do so safely due to medical issues. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek Actual Compensatory Damages, General Compensatory Damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 3, 35-233, 240-266, 346-370) 

Count IV is an action against Parent 1 for Neglect in his Duties as a Medical Personal Representative for Minor and Negligence in Not Enforcing Medical Restrictions upon Minor (705 ILCS 405/2-3) (720 ILCS 5/4-6) (720 ILCS 5/4-7) while a minor he was responsible for and for allowing said individual to drive any vehicle while said individual could no longer do so safely due to medical issues. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek Actual Compensatory Damages, General Compensatory Damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 4, 35-233, 267-284, 346-370) 

Count V is an action against Parent 2 for the Willful and Wanton Conduct (740 ILCS 115/1) of Minor, an unemancipated minor who resides with Parent 2, her legal guardian. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek Actual Compensatory Damages, General Compensatory Damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 5, 35-233, 285-286, 346-370) 

Count VI is an action against Parent 1 for the Willful and Wanton Conduct (740 ILCS 115/1) of Minor an unemancipated minor who resides with Parent 1, her legal guardian. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek Actual Compensatory Damages, General Compensatory Damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 6, 35-233, 287-288, 346-370) 

Count VII is an action against Parent 1 for Negligent Entrustment (Bensman v. Reed (1939),299 Ill.App.531,20 N.E.2d 910. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek Actual Compensatory Damages, General Compensatory Damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 7, 35-233, 289-292, 346-370) 

Count VIII is an action against Parent 1 for his Negligence in Allowing His Vehicle to be Driven on the Roadway Without Proper Maintenance (625 ILCS 5/12-301). By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek Actual Compensatory Damages, General Compensatory Damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 8, 35-233, 293-297, 346-370) 

Count IX is an action against Minor for the Spoilation of Evidence. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek Actual Compensatory Damages, General Compensatory Damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 9, 35-233, 298-303, 346-370) 

Count X is an action against Parent 2 for the Spoilation of Evidence. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek Actual Compensatory Damages, General Compensatory Damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 10, 35-233, 304-309, 346-370) 

Count XI is an action against Parent 1 for the Spoilation of Evidence. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek Actual Compensatory Damages, General Compensatory Damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 11, 35-233, 310-315, 346-370) 

Count XII is an action against Parent 2 for Civil Conspiracy. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 12, 35-233, 316, 346-370) 

Count XIII is an action against Parent 1 for Civil Conspiracy. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 13, 35-233, 317, 346-370) 

Count XIV is an action against Parent 2 for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. By this action, Plaintiff, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2, seek actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiff in connection with this action. (Lines 14, 35-233, 318, 346-370) 

Count XV is an action against Parent 1 for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. By this action, Plaintiff, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2, seek actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiff in connection with this action. (Lines 15, 35-233, 319, 346-370) 

Count XVI is an action against Parent 2 for Loss of Enjoyment of Life. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek General compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 16, 35-233, 320, 346-370) 

Count XVII is an action against Parent 1 for Loss of Enjoyment of Life. By this action, By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek General compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 17, 35-233, 321, 346-370) 

Count XVIII is an action against Parent 2 for Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 18, 35-233, 322, 346-370) 

Count XIX is an action against Parent 1 for Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 19, 35-233, 323, 346-370) 

Count XX is an action against Parent 2 for Tortious Interference with a Contract. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 20, 35-233, 324-327, 346-370) 

Count XXI is an action against Parent 1 for Tortious Interference with a Contract. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 21, 35-233, 328-331, 346-370) 

Count XXII is an action against Parent 2 for Conversion. By this action, Plaintiff, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiff in connection with this action. (Lines 22, 35-233, 332-334, 346-370) 

Count XXIII is an action against Parent 1 for Conversion. By this action, Plaintiff, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintff 2 seek actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiff in connection with this action. (Lines 23, 35-233, 335-337, 346-370) 

Count XXIV is an action against Parent 2 for Fraudulent Misrepresentation. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 24, 35-233, 338-339, 346-370) 

Count XXV is an action against Parent 1 for Fraudulent Misrepresentation. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 25, 35-233, 340-341, 346-370) 

Count XXVI is an action against Parent 2 for Fraudulent Concealment. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 26, 35-233, 338-339, 346-370) 

Count XXVII is an action against Parent 1 for Fraudulent Concealment. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 27, 35-233, 340-341, 346-370) 

Count XXVIII is an action against Parent 2 for Fraud and Deceit. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 28, 35-233, 342-343, 346-370) 

Count XXIX is an action against Parent 1 for Fraud and Deceit. By this action, Plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 seek actual compensatory damages, general compensatory damages, and all costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this action. (Lines 29, 35-233, 344-345, 346-370) 

PARTIES (Lines 30-34) 

Plaintiff, Plaintiff 1, is an individual and a resident of Sangamon County, Illinois.  

Plaintiff, Plaintiff 2, is an individual and a resident of Sangamon County, Illinois. 

Defendant, Minor is an individual and a resident of Sangamon County, Illinois. 

Defendant, Parent 2 is an individual and a resident of Sangamon County, Illinois. 

Defendant, Parent 1 is an individual and a resident of Sangamon County, Illinois. 

Individuals Paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 to Harm the Plaintiffs and Individuals who assisted in the Acts Described in this Occurrence 

List of known individuals involved and how they are tied to the occurrence are as follows: 

Raymond Fabricius – Attorney for Minor (was minor and now adult), Parent 1, Parent 2 

Christine Anto – Attorney for the company paid by Parent 1, and Parent 2 to perform the actions in this occurrence on their behalf. 

Clay Myers – Employee of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 to perform the actions in this occurrence on their behalf. 

Ernest Coy Jr. - Employee of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 to perform the actions in this occurrence on their behalf. 

Eric Thomas – Employee of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 to perform the actions in this occurrence on their behalf. 

Christine Gonzalez – Employee of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 to perform the actions in this occurrence on their behalf. 

Peter LeCleir – Employee of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 to perform the actions in this occurrence on their behalf. 

Brandy Wiltse – Employee of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 to perform the actions in this occurrence on their behalf. 

Zakkiya Andrews – the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 to perform the actions in this occurrence on their behalf. 

Jessica Rilley – Employee of a third-party company paid by the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 to perform the actions in this occurrence on their behalf. 

Marcus Shipe – of a third-party company paid by the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 to perform the actions in this occurrence on their behalf. 

Many Unkown Others (Individual who took title? Individual contacts for attorneys? Individuals making the decisions for attorneys? Unknown individuals who contacted Plaintiffs? Individuals who physically tampered with vehicle?) 

OCCURRENCE (Lines 35-233) 

Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 1 are married.  

Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 have lived at (REDACTED) together with elderly, handicapped Vicitm 1, Plaintiff 2’s mother, for over five years. 

Plaintiff 1 is the sole proprietor of Business 1, a private business. 

Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 are partners in a business that owns and maintains a physical property at (REDACTED). 

On July 06, 2021, Minor posted a TIKTOK video with following statements: “Going into basketball season 7th grade tearing my ACL/miniscus”, “The universe laughing in my face”, “Me thinking its ok but then tearing my knee again 8th grade and rolling both ankles freshman yr”, “The universe laughing again”. 

On July 11, 2022, Minor posted a TIKTOK video with following statements: “Goes to one of the biggest basketball tournaments in North America to compete” and “Tears a ligament 5 min in the first game”. 

On August 2, 2022, Minor posted a TIKTOK video with following statements : “Tears my ACL and my lateral miniscus and is out of sports for over a year”, “Finally gets back but then a year later retears my miniscus which leads to another surgery”, “Gets back 6 months later but then rolls my left ankle bad at the end of freshman year and right ankle sophomore year”, “Goes to play in the (REDACTED) ending up with a torn ACL, and other lateral miniscus tear, and bone damage on my other knee worse injuries than the other knee”, and in description states upcoming surgery scheduled for September 2, 2022. 

On August 19, 2022, between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. Plaintiff 2 was the driver of a 2019 Jeep Cherokee License Plate # (REDACTED), driving north on I-55 business loop heading from Springfield, IL to Sherman, IL, County of Sangamon, State of Illinois.  

On August 19, 2022, between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. Plaintiff 1 was a Passenger in the front seat of the vehicle driven by Plaintiff 2.  

 On August 19, 2022, between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. Minor was the driver of a 2008 Mercury Sable license plate # (REDACTED) driving north on I-55 business loop heading from Springfield, IL to Sherman, IL, County of Sangamon, State of Illinois. 

The vehicle driven by Minor was owned by Parent 1, Minor’s father.   

I-55 Business Loop is a four-lane highway with two-lanes in each direction around the immediate area of the collision. 

The posted Speed Limit at location of accident was 55. 

The posted Speed Limit was 45 immediately prior with a clear line of sight of the stopped vehicles and collision location. 

No skid marks were present within 50 ft of impact spot when officers arrived on scene, as shown in bodycam footage.  

Plaintiff 2 was stopped for 30-60 seconds behind a car making a left turn into Riverside Park when Minor rear ended Plaintiff 2’s vehicle at ~55 mph with little or no braking.    

Plaintiff 2 was in the left lane going north on I-55 business loop when Plaintiff 2 was stopped. 

The right lane was empty and clear of other vehicles at the moment of impact. 

Minor had a clear line of sight shown in bodycam footage of the accident. Visibility was ~500 feet from the top of hill to impact site. 

Minor did not attempt to avoid impacting the vehicle Plaintiff 2 was driving and Plaintiff 1 was a passenger in by reducing speed or by changing lanes to avoid the collision entirely. 

Plaintiff 1 checked on the well-being of Plaintiff 2 before going to assist Minor. 

Plaintiff 1 communicated with Minor directly after the accident and checked on her well-being. 

When Plaintiff 1 got to the passenger window of the vehicle Minor was driving, Minor’s vehicle was still in motion. Minor gave visual signals to state she was ok, and she was unable to stop the vehicle. 

With the assistance of a good Samaritan, Plaintiff 1 was able to bring Minor’s vehicle to a complete stop by physically pushing the vehicle to a stop. 

Plaintiff 1 looked under the vehicle after it stopped and saw numerous fluids falling on the ground and steam coming from under the hood. 

Plaintiff 1 informed the good Samaritan and asked if Minor was physically able to get to the side of the road.  

Plaintiff 1 witnessed Minor exit Minor's vehicle with a large heavy-duty medical knee brace.  

After Minor got to the side of the road, Plaintiff 1 reconfirmed minor was ok before returning to Plaintiff 2 who was sitting on the ground crying. 

When Plaintiff 1 got back to Plaintiff 2 an elderly couple was with her and a volunteer firefighter or off duty officer (unsure which) was walking up and Plaintiff 1 requested he call an ambulance to have Plaintiff 2 checked and requested he go check on Minor.  

Immediately after the first on-duty police officer arrived. 

First On-Duty, Police Officer at the location of occurrence was Officer Glenn Tuxhorn who arrived on scene around 18:00 on 8/19/2022. 

Officer Tuxhorn spoke with witnesses at the location of occurrence and all parties involved in this complaint at the location of occurrence upon his arrival. 

On August 19, 2022, between 18:05 and 18:10 Paramedics arrived on scene and assessed Plaintiff 2 and Minor.  

Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 1 were returning home from picking up Victim 1’s supper from Xochimilco's on Dirksen Parkway in Springfield, Illinois. Plaintiff 2 was worried about her mother who needed to eat with nightly medication and Victim 1’s supper was in the wrecked vehicle.  

Plaintiff 2 refused to ride to the hospital in the ambulance until she could check on her mother and arrange for someone to bring Victim 1 dinner and Victim 1 could take her medication.  

On August 19, 2022, at 18:15:20, Parent 2 speaks to Officer Tuxhorn on speakerphone in front of Minor and Parent 1 and states “I’m her mom, I’m on my way …... I’m concerned if she hit them going at 60 mph, that she is ok …... She said she was going at least 55.” 

(720 ILCS 5/4-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-5)  
    Sec. 4-5. Knowledge. A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:  
        (a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his or, her conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that his or her conduct is of that nature or that those circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that the fact exists.  

        (b) The result of his or her conduct, described by, the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that that result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct. Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully, within the meaning of a statute using the term "willfully", unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.  
    When the law provides that acting knowingly suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally.  
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.) 

On August 19, 2022, at 18:15:50, Officer Tuxhorn tells Parent 2 that Minor’s right leg seems to be in a little pain. 

Illinois State Officer Freitag arrived at the location of the occurrence at approximately 18:15, on 8/19/2022. 

There were comments made in front of Law Enforcement immediately following the accident, Minor made to Parent 1 about previous issues driving on cruise control and braking that prevented Minor from driving the vehicle in a safe manner. 

On August 19, 2022, at 18:27, Officer Tuxhorn stated the following to Parent 1: “They are not going to the hospital by ambulance at this time. She (referring to Plaintiff 2) does have some … upper shoulder... The husband (referring to Plaintiff 1) has seatbelt digs into the body and small cuts from the seatbelts”. 

On August 19, 2022, at 18:50 Minor states in front of Officer Tuxhorn “If it was all my fault, I would be more like with it. But it was because of a shoe, because of a shoe I totaled my car”. 

 On August 19, 2022, at 18:53 Parent 2 told Officer Tuxhorn that Minor has a torn ACL. Officer Tuxhorn informs Parent 2 that “Minor keeps favoring her right leg”. Parent 2 then informs Officer Tuxhorn that Minor has surgery scheduled for September 2nd, 2022. 

(720 ILCS 5/4-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-7) 

    Sec. 4-7. Negligence. A person is negligent, or acts negligently, when that person fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that failure constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.  
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)  

On August 19, 2022, at 18:53 Officer Tuxhorn tells Parent 2 that the brake pedal was all the way on the ground and locked. 

On August 19, 2022, at 18:56, In the presence of Officer Tuxhorn and both parents, Minor stated “When I looked up, I was like this far from the car. It was probably from dad’s car to here. I pressed as hard as I could, got to 50-55. At that point, I literally yanked my foot up at that point..... Then I put my hands on my face.” 

(720 ILCS 5/4-7) (720 ILCS 5/4-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-6)  
    Sec. 4-6. Recklessness. A person is reckless or acts recklessly when that person consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. An act performed recklessly is performed wantonly, within the meaning of a statute using the term "wantonly", unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.  
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)   

On August 19, 2022, at 18:57:42 Minor states to Officer Tuxhorn, “It’s not like I need the car in the next few months anyways, I’m going to be crippled, I’m going to have surgery done, so it doesn’t matter...” 

(745 ILCS 10/1-210) (from Ch. 85, par. 1-210)  
    Sec. 1-210. "Willful and wanton conduct" as used in this Act means a course of action which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property. This definition shall apply in any case where a "willful and wanton" exception is incorporated into any immunity under this Act.  
(Source: P.A. 90-805, eff. 12-2-98.)   

On August 19, 2022, at 18:57:50 Parent 2 tells Officer Tuxhorn that Minor has a doctor’s appointment already scheduled following Tuesday August 23, 2023. 

On August 19, 2022, at 18:58:40 Officer Tuxhorn and Minor discuss the cut on Plaintiff 1’s hip. 

On August 19, 2022, Plaintiff 1 took Plaintiff 2 to Memorial Medical Center to be treated for her injuries. Plaintiff 2 was checked in and into the hospital room with an I.V. by 8:00 p.m. 

On August 20, 2022, Minor posted a TIKTOK video with the following statement “Don’t skip this sound I just got in a 60 mile car crash and totaled my car 3 days before junior year and have to get a ACL miniscus and bone knee reconstruction in 2 weeks”. 

On August 20, 2022, Minor replied to a comment on TIKTOK asking how she was still standing, and Minor replied, “I could not for the first week and after awhile the pain is bearable you can stand on a torn acl this is my third one”. 

Minor was ticketed (REDACTED) for FAILURE TO REDUCE SPEED and has since pleaded guilty on September 28, 2022. Statute 625 5/11-601(a)   

(625 ILCS 5/11-601) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-601)  
    Sec. 11-601. General speed restrictions.  
   (a) No vehicle may be driven upon any highway of this State at a speed which is greater than is reasonable and proper with regard to traffic conditions and the use of the highway, or endangers the safety of any person or property. The fact that the speed of a vehicle does not exceed the applicable maximum speed limit does not relieve the driver from the duty to decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, or when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions. Speed must be decreased as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person or vehicle on or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care. 

On October 10, 2022, Minor posted a TIKTOK video with following statements: “POV: You realize your missing out on your high school sports due many knee injuries” and showing a picture of scars on one knee from previous surgeries and stitches on other knee from a recent surgery. This video also shows a clip of Minor exercising and demonstrating the range of motion her leg has with a knee brace on. 

As a result of Minor’s vehicle impacting the vehicle Plaintiff 2 was driving, the 2019 Jeep Cherokee, Plaintiff 2 was driving was totaled, Plaintiff 1 received minor injuries, and Plaintiff 2 received extensive injuries. 

The vehicle driven by Plaintiff 2 was owned by Victim 1, Plaintiff 2’s elderly, handicapped mother. Victim 1 has never driven the 2019 Jeep Cherokee since it was purchased.  

(720 ILCS 5/2-15a) (from Ch. 38, par. 2-15a) 
    Sec. 2-15a. "Person with a physical disability". "Person with a physical disability" means a person who suffers from a permanent and disabling physical characteristic, resulting from disease, injury, functional disorder, or congenital condition. 
(Source: P.A. 99-143, eff. 7-27-15.) 

Plaintiff 2 had a POA filed with the Illinois Secretary of State for the 2019 Jeep Cherokee described in this complaint. 

Plaintiff 2 was named and covered on the insurance policy #(REDACTED) with USAA Casualty Insurance Comp. and had full legal authority to file a claim for property damage with any insurance company for the 2019 Jeep Cherokee, she was driving at time of occurrence.  

Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 1 are caretakers for Victim 1, who is an elderly and handicapped woman. Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 1 prepare Victim 1’s meals, do Victim 1’s laundry, clean Victims 1’s personal areas and assist with any personal needs or wants Victim 1 may have.   

(755 ILCS 5/4a-5) 
    Sec. 4a-5. Definitions. As used in this Article: 
    (1) "Caregiver" means a person who voluntarily has assumed responsibility for all or a portion of the care of another person who needs assistance with activities of daily living. "Caregiver" includes a caregiver's spouse, cohabitant, child, or employee. "Caregiver" does not include a family member of the person receiving assistance.  

Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 1 were legally responsible for Victim 1’s vehicle when they took possession and drove on an Illinois roadway.  

Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 1 accepted their liability and responsibility to Victim 1 and accepted Victim 1’s demand for settlement. The terms agreed upon between Victim 1 and Plaintiff 2 are as follows: 

Plaintiff 2 would make sure there was a vehicle at the house to be used for Victim 1’s errands and needs until such time Plaintiff 2 could replace the vehicle.  

Plaintiff 2 would replace Victim 1’s vehicle with a vehicle of equal or greater value.  

Plaintiff 2 would reimburse Victim 1 for the USAA insurance payments that were required on the vehicle while title was kept from Plaintiff 2 and Victim 1.  

Plaintiff 1 in September was tasked with filing a complaint with the Illinois Attorney General and in October Plaintiff was given the duty of acquiring the physical title by Victim 1. 

Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 1 gave Victim 1 use of a vehicle until Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 could replace Victim 1’s vehicle.  

Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 1 have replaced Victim 1’s vehicle since the accident.  

According to the Illinois State Police accident report Parent 1’s vehicle was covered by minimum liability insurance as required by law. This policy is in the name of Parent 2 and Parent 1. 

The vehicle insurance policy has Minor listed as an insured driver of the 2008 Mercury Sable involved in this occurrence. 

On Saturday August 20, 2022, USAA claim # (REDACTED) was opened for this occurrence by Plaintiff 2 and Victim 1.  

On Saturday, August 20, 2022, a representative acting on the Defendants’ behalf, contacted Plaintiff 2. The representative stated they had been contacted by a member of the Minor’s family and they acknowledged full liability for the accident. The representatives inquired whether Plaintiff 2 would be willing to speak with them and Plaintiff 2 stated she was. 

(720 ILCS 5/5-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 5-5) 
Sec. 5-5. Accountability for conduct of corporation. 
(a) A person is legally accountable for conduct which is an element of an offense and which, in the name or in behalf of a corporation, he performs or causes to be performed, to the same extent as if the conduct were performed in his own name or behalf. 

On August 22, 2022, Plaintiff 2 scheduled an appointment for Plaintiff 1 with his dentist regarding his chipped teeth.  

On Tuesday August 23, 2022, Plaintiff 2 spoke with Clay Myers and Ernest Coy Jr., individuals employed by the company paid by Parent 2 and Parent 1. This was Plaintiff 2’s first conversation with the Defendants’ representatives since the phone call on Saturday. Plaintiff 2 made a demand of settlement for Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 1, and Victim 1. The offer to settle was to replace the vehicle with same make model year and mileage SUV and pay for Plaintiff 2’s medical bills. No lost income for anyone, no business losses, no court costs, no attorney fees and the plaintiff, Plaintiff 1, agreed to sign his entire claim away for this request and cover his losses and pay his own medical bills.  

On August 23, 2022, Individuals paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 refused to rent Victim 1 a vehicle that would suit her special needs. The vehicle needed enough space for Victim 1’s Wheelchair and her medical equipment. 

On August 24, 2022, individuals employed by the company paid by Parent 2 and Parent 1 sent correspondence to Plaintiff 2 with the following information. 

The e-mail was in addition to a voicemail left prior. 

States the 2019 Jeep Cherokee driven by Plaintiff 2 will be a total loss..   

On August 24, 2022, Ernest Coy Jr., an individuals employed by the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2, sent an e-mail to Plaintiff 2 stating the following: 

“This e/m is in addition to the voicemail I left you. I have reviewed the shops initial estimates and photos. The jeep unfortunately will be a total loss. Please call me to review the settlement figures. I will also need permission to move the vehicle to a storage free lot.” 

The offer Ernest presented would force Plaintiff 2 to pay $5000.00 out of pocket to replace the vehicle she was driving at the occurrence.  

Plaintiff 2 provided dealer quotes and the window sticker for her vehicle when it was purchased and the replacement vehicles that were on the lot at time of purchase and currently available for sale. The replacement vehicles provided had the same year, mileage, and features. She provided vehicle prices that were available at time of accident with a 50-mile radius. The Dealer Quotes show the actual cost to replace the vehicle in August-September 2022 was ~$28,500.00 for same make, year, and mileage car with nearly identical features. 

The week after the accident, a representative working on the Defendants’ behalf stated, “It’s never going to happen”, to the plaintiffs, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 in response to Plaintiff 1, Victim 1, and Plaintiff 2’s demand for settlement.  

Plaintiff 1 spoke with Ernest Coy Jr.’s supervisor the week after the accident and inquired why no inspection had been performed of the vehicle. He also informed the supervisor of the unsolicited legal advice and misrepresentations made by Ernest Coy Jr.. 

Correspondence from August 26, 2022, from the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 to Plaintiff 2 stating the following: 

I’m writing to confirm our telephone conversation on 8/24, 8/25/2022 regarding the completed inspection of your vehicle. 

It is unfortunate to hear about your untimely accident and would like to help you move through the claims process as smoothly as possible. You are currently storing your vehicle at Hollinshead Auto Body and they charge $100.00 per day for storage. Please keep in mind that as the vehicle’s owner, you are responsible for mitigating or minimizing damages, such as vehicle storage charges. I have offered to move your vehicle to a free-storage location at no charge to you and would like to extend that offer to you again. After 08/29/2022 5pm EST, I will not be able to pay for towing and storage fees incurred.  

Please contact me at your earliest convenience so we may discuss moving your vehicle. ....

Signed by Ernest Coy Jr. 

On August 26, 2022, Plaintiff 1 attempted to settle his losses with the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 after the original demand for settlement deadline had passed. 

On August 27, 2022, Plaintiff 2 received the first correspondence with the amount USAA was willing to pay for the property damage. The first offer from USAA was higher than any offer given by the company paid by Parent 2 and Parent 1. USAA offer was also increased later.  

On August 29,2022, Plaintiff 1 informed the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 of his dentist appointment scheduled September 7, 2022. 

On August 29, 2022, Plaintiff 2 hired (REDACTED) to represent her as her attorney for this occurrence. 

Plaintiff 2 requested her attorney deal with the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 for the vehicle while Plaintiff 1 dealt with his personal injury settlements for himself and the Partnership and see whether her attorney had better luck dealing with them. Plaintiff 2 was attempting to avoid using her own insurance for this occurrence if possible and to avoid higher rates.  

On August 29, 2022, the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 sent an e-mail to (REDACTED) stating the following: 

It confirms receipt of messages from Plaintiff 1 with messages attached. These messages informed the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent2 of the losses being claimed in this complaint and some not mentioned in this complaint.  

It confirmed the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 had full knowledge of the partnership between Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2.  

It confirms open claims for Plaintiff 1 and requests/demands by Plaintiff 2.  

If there is no formal representation, they request to continue to discuss the loss with Plaintiff 1. 

Currently awaiting the completion of a second inspection of the 2019 Jeep Cherokee.  

Until this complaint was filed by Plaintiff 1, he only attempted to resolve this matter with the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2.  

Plaintiff 1 was lied to, hung up on, told he did not have any reason to be contacting them, was given inaccurate unsolicited legal advice, was given inaccurate unsolicited medical advice, and had his attempt to resolve this matter denied by the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2. 

The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 have falsified documents and have not kept accurate records of their actions in this occurrence. This falsification of documents and constant misrepresentations have been the cause of severe excessive damage to the plaintiffs Plaintiff1, Plaintiff 2, and their businesses. 

Correspondence from the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 dated September 01, 2022, to Plaintiff 1 containing the following information: 

Informing the plaintiff, Plaintiff 1, that the employee of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 handling this matter for Plaintiff 1 was Christine Gonzalez. 

Plaintiff 1 had very limited interactions with Christine Gonzalez and dealt with Clay Myers for most of the occurrence. Christine Gonzalez only reached out when Clay was allegedly out of the office. 

On September 2, 2022, Plaintiff 2 Attorney informed Plaintiff 2 he called the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 and the voicemail message stated the employee was out of the office until September 7, 2022. Voicemail was full and would not let him leave message. 

On September 7, 2022, Plaintiff 1 saw his dentist and received his temp crowns. 

On September 7, 2022, the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 called Victim 1 and she stated at that time for them to talk with Plaintiff 2 or Plaintiff 1 since she was not involved in the accident.  

Plaintiff 1 filed a complaint #2022-CONSC-00156057 with the Attorney General on September 7, 2022, regarding the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 refusal to replace Victim 1’s vehicle and refusing to send him relevant information after submitting dental records and estimates for the Partnership’s losses. 

On September 12, 2022, Eric Thomas sent correspondence to (REDACTED), Plaintiff 2’s Attorney at the time. The correspondence stated “For the ... 2019 Jeep Cherokee please have your client/Victim 1 release the vehicle. ... cannot continue to pay for storage for this vehicle past Monday 9/12. Any storage after that date may be subtracted from their settlement.” 

On September 14, 2022, Plaintiff 2 received a final offer from the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 regarding the vehicle. This offer was still under the amount offered by USAA. Plaintiff 2 denied this offer.  

On Friday, September 16, 2022, a representative from the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 told Plaintiff 1 to file this complaint in court after Plaintiff 1 was on the phone for an hour and a half. Plaintiff 1’s only request on this call was to speak to a supervisor. Plaintiff 1 was not allowed to speak to a supervisor. He had been attempting to speak to a supervisor for over a week and was not allowed to speak to one in that time after numerous phone calls and messages. 

On September 19, 2022, the plaintiff, Plaintiff 1 filed this complaint for two days of lost work for minor injuries. 

On September 19,2022, Plaintiff 1 informed the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2, he filed this complaint and was still trying to speak with a supervisor. 

On September 19, 2022, the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 sent the following electronic message to Plaintiff 1: 

Hi Plaintiff 1, this is Clay. I have been out of the office since 9/22/22 and so has my supervisor Brandy Wiltse. She will have a chance to respond once she has a chance to review after her return on 9/21/22. Thank you 

On September 20, 2022, the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 sent an e-mail to Plaintiff 2 Attorney stating the following: 

Please release the 2019 Jeep Cherokee from the shop. Any storage after 9/12 will be deducted from the vehicle settlement. Even if you wish to submit additional comparable vehicles, the vehicle needs to be moved from the shop. Failure to release the car will result in a substantial amount deducted from settlement amount due to storage. 

Eric Thomas 

On September 20, 2022, Plaintiff 2 told her attorney to relay the following message to the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2, “They can take the car as long as it's taken to a free lot that I have access to, and they make an offer based on the dealer quote.” Plaintiff 2 also stated the car needs to be left untouched until an agreement for the title is reached. 

On September 20th, 2022, the day after this complaint was filed, the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 sent out a power of attorney (POA) form to Victim 1 in the mail. The correspondence stated the following: 

We’ve determined that your vehicle is a total loss. Now, we’ll need your assistance getting the documents completed and returned within the next 10 business days. 

Please follow the next steps listed below. If you need further assistance, give us a call. We’re here to help. 

On September 21, 2022, the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 sent the following Correspondence to Plaintiff 1: 

09/21/2022 

Re: 2022-LA-000169 

I am still waiting for copy of policy. Lawsuit filed. I am still waiting to speak to supervisors. No contact from your side in almost a week. 

Good Morning Plaintiff 1, 

I hope this email finds you well. I am aware you wanted to speak with me, as Clay responded I was out of the office and returned today. I understand you have filed a lawsuit. We will have defense counsel assigned to respond to you. 

Thank you, 

Brandy Witse 

On September 21, 2022, the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 sent correspondence to Victim 1 stating the following: 

I’m writing to confirm our telephone conversation on 9/7/2022 regarding the completed inspection of your vehicle. 

It is unfortunate to hear about your untimely accident and would like to help you move through the claims process as smoothly as possible. You are currently storing your vehicle at Hollinshead Auto Body and they charge $100.00 per day for storage. Please keep in mind that as the vehicle’s owner, you are responsible for mitigating or minimizing damages, such as vehicle storage charges. I have offered to move your vehicle to a free-storage location at no charge to you and would like to extend that offer to you again. After 09/12/2022 5pm EST, I will not be able to pay for towing and storage fees incurred.  

Please contact me at your earliest convenience so we may discuss moving your vehicle. 

On September 27, 2022, after filing this complaint, a representative acting on the Defendants’ behalf, an unknown employee of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2, took the title of the vehicle Plaintiff 2 was driving in this accident without authorization or settlement for property damage.   

(720 ILCS 5/16-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 16-1) 
    Sec. 16-1. Theft. 
    (a) A person commits theft when he or she knowingly: 
        (1) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over, property of the owner; or 

        (2) Obtains by deception control over property of the, owner; or 

        (4) Obtains control over stolen property knowing the, property to have been stolen or under such circumstances as would reasonably induce him or her to believe that the property was stolen; or 

(b) Sentence.  

      (5) Theft of property exceeding $10,000 and not, exceeding $100,000 in value is a Class 2 felony. 

      (7) Theft by deception, as described by paragraph (2), of subsection (a) of this Section, in which the offender obtained money or property valued at $5,000 or more from a victim 60 years of age or older or a person with a disability is a Class 2 felony. 

(c) When a charge of theft of property exceeding a specified value is brought, the value of the property involved is an element of the offense to be resolved by the trier of fact as either exceeding or not exceeding the specified value. 

(e) Permissive inference; evidence of intent that a person obtains by deception control over property. The trier of fact may infer that a person "knowingly obtains by deception control over property of the owner" when he or she fails to return, within 45 days after written demand from the owner,... 

(f) Offender's interest in the property. 
        (1) It is no defense to a charge of theft of property, that the offender has an interest therein, when the owner also has an interest to which the offender is not entitled.

The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 had no agreements with Victim 1 or Plaintiff 2 regarding the vehicle title before taking the title without authorization.  

(720 ILCS 5/17-13) 
    Sec. 17-13. Fraud in transfers of real and personal property. 
    (a) Conditional sale; sale without consent of title holder. No person purchasing personal property under a conditional sales contract shall, during the existence of such conditional sales contract and before the conditions thereof have been fulfilled, knowingly sell, transfer, conceal, or in any manner dispose of such property, or cause or allow the same to be done, without the written consent of the holder of title. 
    (b) Acknowledgment of fraudulent conveyance. No officer authorized to take the proof and acknowledgment of a conveyance of real or personal property or other instrument shall knowingly certify that the conveyance or other instrument was duly proven or acknowledged by a party to the conveyance or other instrument when no such acknowledgment or proof was made, or was not made at the time it was certified to have been made, with intent to injure or defraud or to enable any other person to injure or defraud.

(d) Sentence. A violation of subsection (a) of this Section is a Class A misdemeanor. A violation of subsection (b) of this Section is a Class 4 felony. A violation of subsection (c) of this Section is a Class 3 felony.
(Source: P.A. 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11.)

(625 ILCS 5/3-114) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 3-114) 
    Sec. 3-114. Transfer by operation of law. 
    (a) If the interest of an owner in a vehicle passes to another other than by voluntary transfer, the transferee shall, except as provided in paragraph (b), promptly mail or deliver within 20 days to the Secretary of State the last certificate of title, if available, proof of the transfer, and his application for a new certificate in the form the Secretary of State prescribes. It shall be unlawful for any person having possession of a certificate of title for a motor vehicle, semi-trailer, or house car by reason of his having a lien or encumbrance on such vehicle, to fail or refuse to deliver such certificate to the owner, upon the satisfaction or discharge of the lien or encumbrance, indicated upon such certificate of title. 

First week of October, Victim 1 received a Power of Attorney form, instructing her to sign authority of the vehicle over to CoPart Inc. in the mail. This Correspondence was a fraudulent attempt to transfer real property with ill intent and clouded by fraudulent concealment of facts.  

(720 ILCS 5/17-24) 
    Sec. 17-24. Mail fraud and wire fraud. 
    (a) Mail fraud. A person commits mail fraud when he or she: 
        (1) devises or intends to devise any scheme or, artifice to defraud, or to obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such a counterfeit or spurious article; and 

        (2) with the intent to execute such scheme or, artifice or to attempt to do so, does any of the following: 

            (A) Places in any post office or authorized, depository for mail matter within this State any matter or thing to be delivered by the United States Postal Service, according to the direction on the matter or thing. 

(D) Knowingly causes any such matter or thing to, be delivered by mail or by private or commercial carrier, according to the direction on the matter or thing. 

On October 7, 2022, Raymond Fabricius filed an Entry of Appearance for Minor, a minor. 

On October 7, 2022, Raymond Fabricius filed a motion with the following: 

Line 6 states “That in the Complaint, the defendants, Parent 1 and Parent 2, are alleged to be the parents of the Defendant, Minor” 

On October 7, 2022, Plaintiff 1 attempted to settle this with Raymond Fabricius, counsel of record for the minor involved in this occurrence. 

None of the offers of settlement or demand for settlement were acknowledged, prior to the Next Friend being named or after, prior to December 11, 2023. 

Thus, concomitant with the general policy favoring compromise and settlement is the principle that, while any adult plaintiff can voluntarily reject a settlement no matter how advantageous, the same is not true in the case of minors. See Ott, 273Ill. App. 3d at 573.  

Rather, when a minor is involved, "the *** court has a duty to prevent the rejection of settlement offers which in the minor's best interests should be accepted" and, should this impede upon the minor's guardian or parents' ability to control the direction of the case, then so be it. Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 573 

Victim 1 contacted the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 directly by phone in October 2022, once learning her title was taken without her authorization. Victim 1 requested the return of the title and the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 refused to return the title. Plaintiff 2’s attorney requested the title be returned also. This prevented Victim 1 or Plaintiff 2 from filing a claim with her own insurance company. 

  (720 ILCS 5/4-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-2)  
    Sec. 4-2. Possession as voluntary act.  
    Possession is a voluntary act if the offender knowingly procured or received the thing possessed, or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient time to have been able to terminate his possession.  
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)   

After receiving the power of attorney form from the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2, Victim 1 assigned the duty of retrieving the physical title back to Plaintiff 1. 

Victim 1 and Plaintiff 2 agreed, Plaintiff 2 would replace Victim 1’s vehicle and give her use of a vehicle until Plaintiff 1 was able to recover Victim 1’s vehicle title and Plaintiff 2 was able to replace Victim 1’s vehicle. 

In October, after Victim 1 received the power of attorney (POA) form, Plaintiff 1 uploaded documents and statements to the Attorney General’s Complaint File regarding the theft of the title to his ongoing complaint.  

(720 ILCS 5/17-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 17-1) 
    Sec. 17-1. Deceptive practices. 
(A) General deception. 
    A person commits a deceptive practice when, with intent to defraud, the person does any of the following: 
        (1) He or she knowingly causes another, by deception, or threat, to execute a document disposing of property or a document by which a pecuniary obligation is incurred. 

On October 12, 2022, Plaintiff 1 sent access to the bodycam footage related to this occurrence to Raymond Fabricius in an e-mail. 

Correspondence dated October 12, 2022, from Raymond Fabricius to Plaintiff 1 with following information: 

I can provide him with a settlement demand. 

States he only represented Minor.  

On October 12, 2022, (REDACTED), legal assistant to Plaintiff 2 Attorney, sent Plaintiff 2 the following message via email: 

An employee of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 advised he personally did not send the payment or receive the title. He further stated he will contact another department as they had contacted the lienholder and sent the payment. 

Plaintiff 1 informed Raymond Fabricius, in emails over the month of October 2022, of all the problems with the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2. 

Correspondence dated November 2, 2022, The Attorney General informed Plaintiff 1 there has been no reply from the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 regarding his complaint.  

On November 08, 2022, the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 sent an e-mail to (REDACTED) for Victim 1 with following correspondence: 

I wanted to reach out to you regarding the 2019 Jeep Cherokee. 

A secure IL power of attorney form is needed from you. 

This is a form we will have to mail to you. 

If you have received the form already, please just mail the form to the address below. 

If not, I will have another one mailed to you. 

Listed Copart as individual to send power of attorney form to Pekin, IL 61554 and signed by Zakkiya Andrews. 

(720 ILCS 5/17-50) (was 720 ILCS 5/16D-5 and 5/16D-6) 
    Sec. 17-50. Computer fraud. 
    (a) A person commits computer fraud when he or she knowingly: 
        (1) Accesses or causes to be accessed a computer or, any part thereof, or a program or data, with the intent of devising or executing any scheme or artifice to defraud, or as part of a deception; 

(2) Obtains use of, damages, or destroys a computer, or any part thereof, or alters, deletes, or removes any program or data contained therein, in connection with any scheme or artifice to defraud, or as part of a deception; or 

(3) Accesses or causes to be accessed a computer or, any part thereof, or a program or data, and obtains money or control over any such money, property, or services of another in connection with any scheme or artifice to defraud, or as part of a deception.   

A response was sent November 8, 2022, informing the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 of the theft and a request to return the vehicle title.  

According to Raymond Fabricius correspondence dated November 8, 2022, the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 has control of the defense and the Defendants are required to cooperate with said company in defending this lawsuit. 

Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163-64, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (internal citations omitted).   These “limitations on the ‘next friend’ doctrine are driven by the recognition that ‘[i]t was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be availed of, as matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves next friends.’ ”  Id. at 164, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (quoting United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir.1921)) 

When a... company employs policy terms that obtain the irrevocable power to determine whether an offer to compromise a personal-injury claim will be accepted or rejected, it creates a fiduciary relationship between it and the insured with resulting duties that grow out of that relationship.  Cernocky, 69 Ill.App.2d at 207-08, 216 N.E.2d at 204 (relying on Ballard, 196 F.2d at 102);  see also Douglas v. Allied American Insurance, 312 Ill.App.3d 535, 543, 245 Ill.Dec. 123, 727 N.E.2d 376, 382 (2000) (“An... company has a fiduciary duty to defend its insured and to consider the...(clients interest.”).  

Courts must offer vigilant protection to those who find themselves in a position of vulnerability in a fiduciary relationship.   See Central Bank-Granite City, 188 Ill.App.3d 936, 136 Ill.Dec. 346, 544 N.E.2d 1121 (elderly);  National Bank of Monticello v. Doss, 141 Ill.App.3d 1065, 96 Ill.Dec. 292, 491 N.E.2d 106 (1986) (mentally limited). 

(815 ILCS 505/12) (from Ch. 121 1/2, par. 272) Sec. 12.  
    This Act shall be known and may be cited as the "Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act". 

(815 ILCS 505/10c)  
    Sec. 10c. Waiver or modification. Any waiver or modification of the rights, provisions, or remedies of this Act shall be void and unenforceable.  

(815 ILCS 505/11a) (from Ch. 121 1/2, par. 271a) Sec. 11a.  
    This Act shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes thereof.  

It is an unlawful practice within the meaning of this Act for any person to  
    (a) Fail, before furnishing copies of the "Notice of Cancellation" to the consumer, to complete the copies by entering the name of the person, the address of the person's place of business, the date of the transaction, and the date, not earlier than the third business day following the date of the transaction, by which the consumer may give notice of cancellation;   

(b) Include in any contract or receipt under this Section any confession of judgment or any waiver of any of the rights to which the consumer is entitled under this Section including specifically his right to cancel the transaction in accordance with the provisions of this Section;  
    (c) Fail to inform each consumer orally, at the time he signs the contract or purchases or leases the goods or services, of his right to cancel;  
    (d) Misrepresent in any manner the consumer's right to cancel;  
    (e) Use any undue influence, coercion or any other willful act or representation to interfere with the consumer's exercise of his rights under this Section; 

On November 10, 2022, Plaintiff 1 received correspondence from the Attorney General’s office with a reply to his complaint from the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 dated Oct 10, 2022.  

In Parsons v. Winter, 142 Ill.App.3d 354, 491 N.E.2d 1236, 1240; 96 Ill.Dec. 776, 780 (1st Dist.1986), the court held that a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant made a statement of a material nature (as opposed to opinion); that the statement was untrue; and that the statement was known or believed to be untrue by the person making it, or made in culpable ignorance of its truth or falsity. To the same effect is Gordon v. Dolin, 105 Ill.App.3d 319, 434 N.E.2d 341, 345; 61 Ill.Dec. 188, 192 (1st Dist.1982). The court did not suggest an enhanced burden of proof with regard to the other elements 

The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 acknowledged they took the title in reply to the Attorney General regarding Plaintiff 1’s complaint, stating their intended victim of theft and fraud is Victim 1, who is an elderly, handicapped woman.  

(720 ILCS 5/17-56) (was 720 ILCS 5/16-1.3) 

    Sec. 17-56. Financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability.  

(a) A person commits financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability when he or she stands in a position of trust or confidence with the elderly person or a person with a disability and he or she knowingly: 

        (1) by deception or intimidation obtains control over the property of an elderly person or a person with a disability; or 

        (2) illegally uses the assets or resources of an elderly person or a person with a disability. 

    (c) For purposes of this Section: 

        (1) "Elderly person" means a person 60 years of age or older. 

        (2) "Person with a disability" means a person who suffers from a physical or mental impairment resulting from disease, injury, functional disorder or congenital condition that impairs the individual's mental or physical ability to independently manage his or her property or financial resources, or both. 

        (4) "Deception" means, in addition to its meaning as defined in Section 15-4 of this Code, a misrepresentation or concealment of material fact relating to the terms of a contract or agreement entered into with the elderly person or person with a disability or to the existing or pre-existing condition of any of the property involved in such contract or agreement; or the use or employment of any misrepresentation, false pretense or false promise in order to induce, encourage or solicit the elderly person or person with a disability to enter into a contract or agreement. 

    The illegal use of the assets or resources of an elderly person or a person with a disability includes, but is not limited to, the misappropriation of those assets or resources by undue influence, breach of a fiduciary relationship, fraud, deception, extortion, or use of the assets or resources contrary to law. 

    A person stands in a position of trust and confidence with an elderly person or person with a disability when he (i) is a parent, spouse, adult child or other relative by blood or marriage of the elderly person or person with a disability, (ii) is a joint tenant or tenant in common with the elderly person or person with a disability, (iii) has a legal or fiduciary relationship with the elderly person or person with a disability, (iv) is a financial planning or investment professional, (v) is a paid or unpaid caregiver for the elderly person or person with a disability, or (vi) is a friend or acquaintance in a position of trust. 

    (e) Good faith efforts. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to impose criminal liability on a person who has made a good faith effort to assist the elderly person or person with a disability in the management of his or her property, but through no fault of his or her own has been unable to provide such assistance. 

    (f) Not a defense. It shall not be a defense to financial exploitation of an elderly person or person with a disability that the accused reasonably believed that the victim was not an elderly person or person with a disability. Consent is not a defense to financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability if the accused knew or had reason to know that the elderly person or a person with a disability lacked capacity to consent. 

    (g) Civil Liability. A civil cause of action exists for financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability as described in subsection (a) of this Section. A person against whom a civil judgment has been entered for financial exploitation of an elderly person or person with a disability shall be liable to the victim or to the estate of the victim in damages of treble the amount of the value of the property obtained, plus reasonable attorney fees and court costs. In a civil action under this subsection, the burden of proof that the defendant committed financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability as described in subsection (a) of this Section shall be by a preponderance of the evidence. This subsection shall be operative whether or not the defendant has been charged or convicted of the criminal offense as described in subsection (a) of this Section. This subsection (g) shall not limit or affect the right of any person to bring any cause of action or seek any remedy available under the common law, or other applicable law, arising out of the financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability. 

    (h) If a person is charged with financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability that involves the taking or loss of property valued at more than $5,000, a prosecuting attorney may file a petition with the circuit court of the county in which the defendant has been charged to freeze the assets of the defendant in an amount equal to but not greater than the alleged value of lost or stolen property in the defendant's pending criminal proceeding for purposes of restitution to the victim. The burden of proof required to freeze the defendant's assets shall be by a preponderance of the evidence. 

The response to the Attorney General included fraudulent concealment of material facts and was sent from the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 by Peter LeCleir.  

The response did not inform the Attorney General that the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 took the vehicle title without settlement, agreement, or authorization from anyone to do so.  

The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 did not inform the Attorney General that Victim 1 contacted the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 directly, shown on phone records, and requested the return of the title.  

The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 did not inform the Attorney General that (REDACTED), Plaintiff 2’s Attorney at the time, requested the return of the vehicle title. 

The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 did not inform the Attorney General that neither Plaintiff 2 nor Victim 1 had any business relationship with them. 

The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 did not inform them that Plaintiff 2 and Victim 1 were not their clients/customers. 

To be “material” the representation must relate to a matter upon which the plaintiff could be expected to rely in determining to engage in the conduct in question. McPherson v. Hewitt, 32 Ill.App.3d 435, 443; 335 N.E.2d 606, 612 (2d Dist.1975). It may not be an opinion (Davis v. Nehf, 14 Ill.App.3d 318, 302 N.E.2d 382 (1st Dist.1973)), nor a promise of future action (Polivka v. Worth Dairy, Inc., 26 Ill.App.3d 961, 328 N.E.2d 350 (1st Dist.1974)).  

It may be actionable even if the misrepresentation was not the sole inducement (Hicks v. Stevens, 121 Ill. 186, 11 N.E. 241 (1887)).  

A misrepresentation is “material” and therefore actionable if it is such that had the other party been aware of it, the party would have acted differently. Perlman v. Time, Inc., 64 Ill.App.3d 190, 197; 380 N.E.2d 1040, 1045; 20 Ill.Dec. 831, 836 (1st Dist.1978). The misrepresented condition must be an essential element to the transaction between the parties. Mack v. Plaza Dewitt Limited Partnership, 137 Ill.App.3d 343, 484 N.E.2d 900, 906; 92 Ill.Dec. 169, 175 (1st Dist.1985) 

On November 14, 2022, on the first court date, Plaintiff 1 informed the court and defense counsel of the theft and the court and counsel for the defendants refused to act. Two officers of the court allowed Victim 1 and Plaintiff 2 to be deprived of their property. 

Hippocratic Oath for Lawyers: I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be), that I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of attorney and counselor at law to the best of my ability. 

SECTION 2. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
    No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws. 

The minor involved in this complaint was considered a ward of the court and it was the duty of the court that the minor is properly represented.  

Plaintiff 1 addressed the issues with Judge Noll regarding the minor and her representation and the court has refused to act on behalf of the minor, a ward of the court. 

These “limitations on the ‘next friend’ doctrine are driven by the recognition that ‘[i]t was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be availed of, as matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves next friends.’ ” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163-64, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (quoting United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir.1921)). 

In Illinois, every minor involved in litigation is a ward of the court. (Ott by Ott v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 273 Ill.App.3d 563, 570–71 (1st Dist. 1995) 

On the first court date, the attorney of record for the minor, still unknown who hired at that time since the minor had no next friend, Raymond Fabricius entered courtroom from side judge enters courtroom. In court Raymond Fabricius stated that naming the next friend was the Plaintiff’s burden and Judge Noll seemed to agree with him. These constant misrepresentations have caused excess burden and cost that could no longer be allowed after a year. 

“This holding is based on the well-settled rule of law that a minor cannot bring a legal proceeding nor engage in one in person or by an attorney but must appear by a guardian, a guardian ad litem or a next friend. (Waechter v. Industrial Com. supra; Walgreen Co. v. Industrial Com. 323 Ill. 194.  

So v. Suchanek, 670 F.3d 1304, 1310–11 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (rejecting as irrelevant the lawyer’s subjective belief that no conflict existed in a joint representation; rather, the analysis depended on whether an objective observer with the lawyer’s knowledge of the circumstances would have reasonably doubted his ability to undertake the joint representation); Robertson v. Wittenmyer, 736 N.E.2d 804, 807–08 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that the lawyer could not have reasonably believed that the representation of one client against another was permissible).   

In the insurance defense context, a defense lawyer’s conflict of interest arising out of the representation of multiple insureds may entitle the insureds to independent counsel at the insurer’s expense. See, e.g., Univ. of Miami v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 112 So. 3d 504, 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (“[I]n defense of both co-defendants, Great American’s counsel would have had to argue conflicting legal positions, that each of its clients was not at fault, and the other was, even to the extent of claiming indemnification and contribution for the other’s fault. . . . [T]his legal dilemma clearly created a conflict of interest . . . sufficient to qualify for indemnification for attorney’s fees and costs for independent counsel.”   

Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Willey, 889 N.W.2d 647, 653–54 (Iowa 2017) (“The key questions a lawyer must ask are whether it is likely a difference of interests will occur between the clients and, if so, whether that difference in interests will interfere with the lawyer’s ability to offer independent, professional judgment to each client.” (citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Cousin, 88 N.E.3d 822, 834–38 (Mass. 2018) (discussing situations that may present Rule 1.7(a)(2) conflicts); State ex rel. Union Planters Bank, N.A. v. Kendrick, 142 S.W.3d 729, 736 (Mo. 2004) (noting that this kind of conflict of interest “in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client”). 

Plaintiff was tasked with naming the next friend by Judge Noll and Raymond Fabricius, when Plaintiff 1 is the one person who should not be naming the next friend for the minor defendant. Plaintiff informed Judge Noll of this fact, but he was still mandated to name the Next Friend. The plaintiff named another previously named defendant as the Next Friend since no other person could be found by the plaintiff willing to perform this duty. The court approved this appointment and since then the other defendants have claimed liability for minor while denying their own. The Next Friend, another defendant, Parent 2 is answering and testifying for the minor and the attorney for the minor, Raymond Fabricius has refused to let the minor testify for herself and has allowed another defendant to testify for her in an effort to conceal their own involvement. 

Where no guardian nor next friend of a minor appears, it is the duty of the court to appoint one. (Simpson v. Simpson, 273 Ill. 90; Millard v. Marmon, 116 Ill. 649,7 N.E. 468 (1886)

Any action taken at law or in equity against the minor without such representation is voidable. (White v. Kilmartin, 205 Ill. 525; Hall v. Davis, 44 id. 494.)  

Not only will courts see that a guardian ad litem is appointed for the protection of rights of minors but will exercise constant supervision over such guardian ad litem to see that no interest of the minor or other person under legal disability is prejudiced. Gibbs v. Andrews, 299 Ill. 510. 

On February 22, 2023, the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 sent an e-mail to Plaintiff 1 / Victim 1 inquiring into the status of the power of attorney form for the 2019 Jeep Cherokee. The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 acknowledges the vehicle title is still in Victim 1’s name. 

The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 requested the original power of attorney form be mailed to Copart, so they can process the salvage once the vehicle is released from hold status in electronic correspondence dated February 22, 2023. 

(720 ILCS 5/17-50) (was 720 ILCS 5/16D-5 and 5/16D-6) 
    Sec. 17-50. Computer fraud. 
    (a) A person commits computer fraud when he or she knowingly: 
        (1) Accesses or causes to be accessed a computer or, any part thereof, or a program or data, with the intent of devising or executing any scheme or artifice to defraud, or as part of a deception; 

(2) Obtains use of, damages, or destroys a computer, or any part thereof, or alters, deletes, or removes any program or data contained therein, in connection with any scheme or artifice to defraud, or as part of a deception; or 

(3) Accesses or causes to be accessed a computer or, any part thereof, or a program or data, and obtains money or control over any such money, property, or services of another in connection with any scheme or artifice to defraud, or as part of a deception.   

On February 27, 2023, Minor was stricken from this complaint because the plaintiff, Plaintiff 1, could not find anyone who would agree to serve as the “Next Friend” to the minor. 

Plaintiff 1 had attempted to have the State’s Attorney and Attorney General act on behalf of the minor, but they both refused to get involved. 

On February 27, 2023, a USB drive containing all facts including bodycam footage and copies of correspondence were filed into the court record as Exhibit USB / Boday Cam / Digital Pictures. 

Plaintiff 1 named Parent 2 to serve as the “Next Friend” almost six months after filing the original complaint out of desperation. The minor was stricken from this complaint by Judge Noll on February 27, 2023, because Plaintiff 1 refused to name co-defendants as the Next Friend due to conflicts and stated as much.  

Where a minor’s parents fail to appear for a motion for summary judgment, a court may find that the representation is not adequate. (Id., at 108, 111–12)  

Thus, a court will appoint a GAL when the interests of the minor and next friend are different, (Skaggs, 371 Ill. at 541–42) adverse, (Kroot v. Liberty Bank of Chicago,307 Ill.App.209, 214 (1st Dist. 1940)) or conflicting. (Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Strickland, 33 Ill.App.3d 52, 58 (1st Dist. 1975); In re Estate of Viehman, 47 Ill.App.2d 138, 149 (5th Dist. 1964)) 

 Additionally, a court will appoint a GAL to review and complete a settlement offer that is in the best interests of the minor, if the next friend rejects such an offer or refuses to follow through on it. (Will v. Northwestern Univ., 378 Ill.App.3d 280, 294 (1st Dist. 2007); Ott by Ott v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 273 Ill.App.3d 563, 571 (1st Dist. 1995)) 

On May 12, 2023, Victim 1 signed and submitted a notarized statement into court file for this complaint to retrieve her property.  

This court refused Victim 1 the opportunity to speak for herself via electronic means before refusing to acknowledge the issue and ruling against motions by the plaintiff, Plaintiff 1. 

On May 25, 2023, Ernest Coy Jr. called Plaintiff 1 on behalf of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 stating they would be returning Victim 1’s title and stated they needed to return the vehicle. Plaintiff 1 stated they would need to make direct contact with Victim 1 or Plaintiff 2 for that decision. 

On May 25, 2023, Plaintiff 1 discussed conversation with Victim 1 and Plaintiff 2.  

On May 25, 2023, Plaintiff 1 sent an e-mail to the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 with Victim 1’s and Plaintiff 2’s conditions that must be met before the vehicle can be transported. The unilateral terms specifically stated are as follows: 

In reference to call from Ernest regarding title and vehicle. 

Ernest stated call was recorded.  
Ernest stated they were returning vehicle and title. 

Plaintiff 1 stated “ok, this will not change current court filings.” 

ernest replied he knew nothing about court and stated that (REDACTED) was address they had. Was that address to be delivered too.  

I stated he would need to make direct contact with Victim 1 or Plaintiff 2 for that decision. 

he agreed  

neither have been contacted by ... before writing this email. Below is their decision.  

To whom it may concern, 

The vehicle will be taken to following country property address after issues have been addressed: 

(REDACTED)

No-lien Title must be in Victim 1's possession before vehicle is allowed to be moved or damaged further per her insurance company.  

HOA fees of unknown amounts will be incurred if placed at 

(REDACTED) and if....or anyone acting on their behalf, places vehicle at (REDACTED) address they agree to pay any HOA fees assessed.  

Any costs incurred as a result of these delays is a cost ... incurred by violating law. Any costs to lawfully correct these things must be addressed and dealt with by them. Unless .... chooses to violate laws and ignore more rights all these legal issues must be addressed... Chase stated months ago they released lien. Title was kept from us for months. Liens are not transferred without proper paperwork. So can not undo that now. Problem until there is a title without a lien we can not allow it to be legally moved around where it can damage or injure others... So we cannot legally allow you to touch it. We do not accept liability for any damages caused by moving or transporting caused to any individuals or to property at delivery address or elsewhere or the vehicle itself until we have proper legal title in our possession...And our insurance verifies its insured to be moved. We will not accept any vehicle if any parts or pieces have been removed or missing. I.E. catalytic converter. Until these issues are all resolved the vehicle cannot be legally moved and we do not accept liability for any of the damages that may or may not happen as a result of the delay or transfer. ... I plan to address in court. How ... chooses to address is their choice. They do without our consent. We also do not accept any delivery without statement from Plaintiff 1 acknowledging all parts are there and everything is same as initial inspection when agreement for a pre scheduled delivery is fulfilled. I only authorize Plaintiff 1 to accept delivery of vehicle. Authorization to move vehicle will not be approved by anyone without proper legal no-lien title in Victim 1 possession beforehand and all legal issues surrounding the vehicle title and insurance resolved. Some of Current court filings attached. 

This does not waive nor defer any of the harm ... has already done by withholding these things from Victim 1. It does not waive any of the liability caused by ... in this matter nor does this waive the civil rights violations or criminal laws broken.   

Any further actions done without written authorization or court approval is done on ... own accord and they are solely responsible for the damages caused. 

Any concerns can be addressed in court Monday June 5th 2023 in front of Judge Noll at sangamon county courthouse at 9:00 a.m.  

Sincerely, 

Plaintiff 1 

On June 5, 2023, Victim 1 submitted a single demand for settlement since no one would assist her in this theft and the ones who were willing to help, were ignored.  The e-mail was not acknowledged by anyone except electronic verification from the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 stating the correspondence had been received and added to the file.  

On June 7, 2023, Victim 1 and Plaintiff 2 filed a police report regarding the theft of the vehicle title.    

On June 15, 2023, between 12 p.m. and 4 p.m. Ernest Coy Jr. called Plaintiff 1’s phone stating the call was being recorded and asking to speak with Plaintiff 2. Plaintiff 2 was represented by an attorney and had a no contact order.  

On June 15, 2023, Plaintiff 1 handed his phone to Plaintiff 2, while the speakerphone was on. After Ernest Coy Jr. started asking questions.  One question he asked was if she had received the last offer. No offer has been received by any Plaintiff since September 2022 regarding anything in this occurrence. Plaintiff 2 stated she had no idea what he was talking about. Plaintiff 1 interrupted and stated he should not have called her; she has an attorney. 

On July 12, 2023, A lawsuit 2023-SC002088 was filed against Plaintiff 2 for Medical Bills associated to this occurrence.  

On July 16, 2023, the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 sent an e-mail to Plaintiff 1 / Victim 1 dated July 7 ,2023 stating the following: 

To: Victim 1 

1. Investigation of the loss is continuing. 

2. We are waiting for the completion of the court action. 

The correspondence sent to Plaintiff 1 e-mail was a willful and wanton attempt to use the theft of the title and the property damage claim as leverage against the plaintiff, Plaintiff 1, for filing this complaint. 

(720 ILCS 5/12-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 12-6) 

    Sec. 12-6. Intimidation. 

    (a) A person commits intimidation when, with intent to cause another to perform or to omit the performance of any act, he or she communicates to another, directly or indirectly by any means, a threat to perform without lawful authority any of the following acts: 

        (1) Inflict physical harm... on property; or 

        (3) Commit a felony or Class A misdemeanor; or 

        (6) Take action as a public official against anyone or anything, or withhold official action, or cause such action or withholding; or 

On July 19, 2023, Jessica Rilley, an employee of a third-party company under contract by the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 returned the vehicle title to Victim 1 in the mail. 

On July 25, 2023, Christine Anto reached out directly to the plaintiff, Plaintiff 1, on the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 behalf. Christine Anto stated she represented the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2, who requested her to resolve the issues between Plaintiff 1 and the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 pertaining to property damage claim and was now requesting Plaintiff 1 stop contacting their employees.  

After months of correspondence, Christine Anto made no offer to settle the vehicle or any of the claims mentioned in this occurrence on behalf of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2.  

Plaintiff 1 attempted to settle this matter with the attorney, Christine Anto. Plaintiff 1 had one demand, which was the minor in this complaint be properly represented before settlement could be reached. The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 refused. 

When a .... company employs policy terms that obtain the irrevocable power to determine whether an offer to compromise a personal-injury claim will be accepted or rejected, it creates a fiduciary relationship between it and the .... with resulting duties that grow out of that relationship. Cernocky, 69 Ill.App.2d at 207- 08, 216 N.E.2d at 204 (relying on Ballard, 196 F.2d at 102);  see also Douglas v. Allied American Insurance, 312 Ill.App.3d 535, 543, 245 Ill.Dec. 123, 727 N.E.2d 376, 382 (2000) (“An... company has a fiduciary duty to defend its ... and to consider the... interest.”).  

Courts must offer vigilant protection to those who find themselves in a position of vulnerability in a fiduciary relationship. See Central Bank-Granite City, 188 Ill.App.3d 936, 136 Ill.Dec. 346, 544 N.E.2d 1121 (elderly);  National Bank of Monticello v. Doss, 141 Ill.App.3d 1065, 96 Ill.Dec. 292, 491 N.E.2d 106 (1986) (mentally limited) 

On August 11, 2023, the new valid title for 2019 Jeep Cherokee was received from the Secretary of State’s Office. 

In the beginning of August 2023, Plaintiff 2 stopped being represented by (REDACTED) after being sued and going to court (2023-SC-002088) for damages caused by this occurrence. 

On August 14, 2023, Christine Anto informed Plaintiff 1 that CoPart would be returning the vehicle, and she requested an address for delivery and a phone number. 

Christine Anto, the attorney representing the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2, made an agreement with Plaintiff 1 regarding vehicle return based on the plaintiffs’ unilateral demands. The terms were the same given to Ernest previously by Victim 1 and Plaintiff 2. 

Plaintiff 1 made agreement and arrangements with the owner of the property where the totaled 2019 Jeep Cherokee was to be stored, which required 24-hour notice.  

Plaintiff 2’s phone number was given as contact for the return of the vehicle since she is more accessible than Plaintiff 1 for phone conversations. 

The week the 2019 Jeep Cherokee was dumped, Plaintiff 2 submitted a new demand for settlement to Christine Anto. Plaintiff 2 was in the process of submitting her losses when the vehicle was dumped. 

Plaintiff 2’s second demand for settlement was denied by the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2.  

On August 17, 2023, after filing police reports and upon the return of the vehicle title after almost a year, representatives from Copart Inc. who are under contract with the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 dumped the salvage vehicle without notice or inspection on a property located inside Sangamon County, Illinois.  

(720 ILCS 5/4-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-4)  
    Sec. 4-4. Intent.  
    A person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct.  

(720 ILCS 5/47-15)  Sec. 47-15. Dumping garbage upon real property. 
    (a) It is unlawful for a person to dump, deposit, or place garbage, rubbish, trash, or refuse upon real property not owned by that person without the consent of the owner or person in possession of the real property. 
    (b) A person who violates this Section is liable to the owner or person in possession of the real property on which the garbage, rubbish, trash, or refuse is dumped, deposited, or placed for the reasonable costs incurred by the owner or person in possession for cleaning up and properly disposing of the garbage, rubbish, trash, or refuse, and for reasonable attorneys' fees. 

Plaintiff 1 informed the driver, who was dumping the vehicle, that Plaintiff 2 and himself were in a meeting with a lawyer regarding this complaint in Springfield, IL and we would not be done for a few hours.  

Plaintiff 1 informed the driver that the vehicle needed to be inspected before delivery could be accepted, and that 24-hour notice was needed for approval from the property owner to store the vehicle.  

The driver who dumped the vehicle called and spoke with a manager at CoPart, Inc. in Pekin, IL and was instructed to “just dump it” by the CoPart Inc. employee after the tow truck driver explained the situation. 

Victim 1’s vehicle had been disassembled, had more damage, and had parts removed and missing upon dumping. 

(625 ILCS 5/4-102) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 4-102)  

    Sec. 4-102. Offenses relating to motor vehicles and other vehicles - Misdemeanors.  

    (a) It is a violation of this Chapter for:  

        (1) A person, without authority to do so, to damage a vehicle or to damage or remove any part of a vehicle;  

        (2) A person, without authority to do so, to tamper with a vehicle or go in it, on it, or work or attempt to work any of its parts, or set or attempt to set it in motion;  

        (3) A person to fail to report a vehicle as unclaimed in accordance with the provisions of Section 4-107.  

    (b) Sentence. A person convicted of a violation of this Section shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. A person convicted of a violation of this Section a second or subsequent time, shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony. 

The ABS Computer was removed from the vehicle after this complaint was filed. 

failure to produce relevant evidence because it was destroyed prior to filing a lawsuit can be sanctioned because of the duty a potential litigant owes to preserve relevant and material evidence. Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corporation, 181 Ill.2d 112, 692 N.E.2d 286, 229 (1998).  

Per comments to law enforcement who spoke to the CoPart Inc. employees, CoPart Inc. employees told law enforcement that anything done would have been done at the request of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2. 

(720 ILCS 5/4-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-5)  
    Sec. 4-5. Knowledge. A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:  
        (a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his or, her conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that his or her conduct is of that nature or that those circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that the fact exists.  

        (b) The result of his or her conduct, described by, the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that that result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct. Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully, within the meaning of a statute using the term "willfully", unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.  
    When the law provides that acting knowingly suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally.  
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.) 

The ABS Computer stores evidence and information from the vehicle accident relevant to this complaint including but not limited to the ABS engagement log from when the impact occurred and information regarding the speed at the moment of impact. 

SUBSTANTIAL NEED/ UNDUE HARDSHIP FOR ORDINARY WORK PRODUCT-A finding that a document is prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial does not end the inquiry because it can be overcome by a showing that the party has substantial need for the document and the party is unable to obtain the substantial equivalent without undue hardship. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(a)(ii). The burden is on the requesting party to show the relevance and importance of the document and the inability to obtain the facts from other sources. A party may be required to take a deposition of a witness before seeking privileged documents. National Union Fire Ins. V. Murray Sheet Metal, 967 F.2d , 980, 985 (4th Cir. 1992). 

The items removed from the vehicle were never returned to Plaintiff 2 or Victim 1. 

(720 ILCS 5/16-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 16-1) 
Sec. 16-1. Theft. 
(a) A person commits theft when he or she knowingly: 
(1) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner; or 
(2) Obtains by deception control over property of the owner; or 
(4) Obtains control over stolen property knowing the property to have been stolen or under such 
circumstances as would reasonably induce him or her to believe that the property was stolen; or 
(A) Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property; or 
(B) Knowingly uses, conceals or abandons the property in such manner as to deprive the owner 
permanently of such use or benefit; or 
(C) Uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing such use, concealment or abandonment 
probably will deprive the owner permanently of such use or benefit 

All the previously mentioned acts prevented Plaintiff 2 or Victim 1 from filing a claim with their own insurance company for over a year. Victim 1 is handicapped and requires special medical equipment to get around like her wheelchair. Any vehicle she is transported in must have room for these items.  

On August 30, 2023, USAA sent correspondence to Victim 1 and stated the following regarding claim # (REDACTED): 

Per our conversation earlier, this is the information we found out earlier. That the owner retained was put in by “Plaintiff 2”, and we have confirmed that this was done by the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 some time between August 15th. Thank you!  

After dumping the vehicle, the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 submitted false and fraudulent information over the Computer to USAA. According to the information supplied to USAA, Plaintiff 2 requested an Owner Retain on the vehicle in violation of: 

(The Administrative Code, Title 50/Insurance, Chapter 1..., Subchapter 1/Provisions Applicable to all companies, Part 919 Improper ...Practice,   Section 919.EXHIBIT A Total Loss ... 8) Retaining Your Totalled Vehicle - In an effort to minimize automobile "chop shop" crime, the Illinois Vehicle Code does not permit you the right to retain the salvage once your automobile has been deemed a total loss....  The...company must take possession of the vehicle, if the vehicle is eight model years or newer. 

(720 ILCS 5/17-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 17-3)  
    Sec. 17-3. Forgery.  
    (a) A person commits forgery when, with intent to defraud, he or she knowingly:  
        (1) makes a false document or alters any document to, make it false and that document is apparently capable of defrauding another; or  

        (2) issues or delivers such document knowing it to, have been thus made or altered; or  

        (3) possesses, with intent to issue or deliver, any, such document knowing it to have been thus made or altered; or  

        (4) unlawfully uses the digital signature, as defined, in the Financial Institutions Electronic Documents and Digital Signature Act, of another; or  

        (5) unlawfully creates an electronic signature of, another person, as that term is defined in the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act.  

    (b) (Blank).  
    (c) A document apparently capable of defrauding another includes, but is not limited to, one by which any right, obligation or power with reference to any person or property may be created, transferred, altered or terminated. A document includes any record or electronic record as those terms are defined in the Electronic Commerce Security Act. For purposes of this Section, a document also includes a Universal Price Code Label or coin.  
    (c-5) For purposes of this Section, "false document" or "document that is false" includes, but is not limited to, a document whose contents are false in some material way, or that purports to have been made by another or at another time, or with different provisions, or by authority of one who did not give such authority.  

This Fraudulent information was then used to prevent Plaintiff 2 or Victim 1 from filing a claim with USAA, their own insurance company.  Owner retained is defined in previous contracts by the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 as: 

(720 ILCS 5/17-50) (was 720 ILCS 5/16D-5 and 5/16D-6) 
    Sec. 17-50. Computer fraud. 
    (a) A person commits computer fraud when he or she knowingly: 
        (1) Accesses or causes to be accessed a computer or, any part thereof, or a program or data, with the intent of devising or executing any scheme or artifice to defraud, or as part of a deception; 

(2) Obtains use of, damages, or destroys a computer, or any part thereof, or alters, deletes, or removes any program or data contained therein, in connection with any scheme or artifice to defraud, or as part of a deception; or 

(3) Accesses or causes to be accessed a computer or, any part thereof, or a program or data, and obtains money or control over any such money, property, or services of another in connection with any scheme or artifice to defraud, or as part of a deception.   

Plaintiff 2 was eventually able to file a claim in September 2023, with her own automotive insurance provider, USAA, nearly a year after the accident. USAA paid the following amounts to Plaintiff 2 and Victim 1: 

$25,649.82 towards property damage. Plaintiff 2 was informed the difference from actual value of vehicle must be collected in court. Due to the amount of time that has passed since the accident, they were limited in what they could offer.   

$1073.16 for rentals reimbursement. 

$5,000 in medical payments. 

On October 30, 2023, Judge Noll ruled against Plaintiff 1’s Motion to Disqualify Raymond Fabricius from this complaint stating the following: 

Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Mr. Fabricious argued. Plaintiff plays videos from body cameras and Tik Tok videos in Court. Motion to Disqualify is DENIED. There is no reason to disqualify Mr. Fabricious from continuing to act as counsel for Defendants, and there is no reason for the Court to report him. 

On October 30, 2023, regarding the representation of the minor that court states: 

To clear up any uncertainty, Court approves Parent 1 to continue to serve as Next Friend of Minor. Plaintiff's motion to Amend Complaint argued and ALLOWED. 

Neither the parents nor the Next Friend of the minor have ever been in this court once or ever took an interest in the minor’s court case since the original complaint was filed on September 19, 2022, until the filing of this eleventh amended complaint.    

On October 30, 2023, the court ruled on the claim for losses at (REDACTED) owned by the unnamed partnership between Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2. Stating the following: 

Plaintiff indicates it will take one year for him to provide full and complete responses to Defendants' Supplemental Request and he objects to doing so. In light of this, Court grants alternative relief sought by Defendants. Plaintiff 1 is barred from making any claim for expenses allegedly incurred regarding (REDACTED). 

What the court fails to mention in its notes is that this partnership is a single independent entity and any partner under Illinois law may make the claim for its losses and that the Defendant’s request is for separate independent business information with no connection to the property or partnership claimed. 

Plaintiff 1 has no authority to provide the documents requested and would be considered criminal theft in his personal capacity. Due to his refusal to assist with criminal activity, this court has barred incomes after all business documents for this partnership were submitted. 

This happened in the clear violation of the professional code of conduct and in violation of many third parties' rights. 

Plaintiff 1 tried to limit his losses claimed but after constant harassment and prejudice, Plaintiff 1 had no choice left but to claim additional losses on this complaint since no one would act after a year to protect the minor properly. 

Plaintiff 1 has had burden of protecting the minor’s rights since the court, her attorney, and her parents have shown neglect. This court has deprived this minor of her rights by not interjecting for its ward and by allowing crimes to be committed against her and on her behalf. 

Plaintiff 1 has made a good faith effort to allow the minor in this complaint to walk away multiple times and has offered multiple settlements that were rejected or not acknowledged on the minor’s behalf. The law prohibits the plaintiff from filing a complaint against the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2. After the time wasted by Minor’s representatives, Plaintiff 1 cannot wait to proceed any longer nor does he wish to fight a second complaint at his expense. 

 It has been held that under Rule 14(a) the plaintiff need not amend his complaint to state a claim against such third party if he does not wish to do so. Satink v. Holland Township (D.N.J. 1940) 31 F.Supp. 229, noted (1940) 88 U.Pa.L.Rev. 751; Connelly v. Bender (E.D.Mich. 1941) 36 F.Supp. 368; Whitmire v. Partin v. Milton (E.D.Tenn. 1941) 5 Fed.Rules Serv. 14a.513, Case 2; Crim v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. (D.D.C. 1939) 26 F.Supp. 715; Carbola Chemical Co., Inc. v. Trundle (S.D.N.Y. 1943) 7 Fed.Rules Serv. 14a.224, Case 1; Roadway Express, Inc. v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co. (N.D.Ohio 1945) 8 Fed.Rules Serv. 14a.513, Case 3. In Delano v. Ives(E.D.Pa. 1941) 40 F.Supp. 672, the court said: “. . . the weight of authority is to the effect that a defendant cannot compel the plaintiff, who has sued him, to sue also a third party whom he does not wish to sue, by tendering in a third party complaint the third party as an additional defendant directly liable to the plaintiff.” Thus impleader here amounts to no more than a mere offer of a party to the plaintiff, and if he rejects it, the attempt is a time-consuming futility. See Satink v. Holland Township, supra; Malkin v. Arundel Corp. (D.Md. 1941) 36 F.Supp. 948; also Koenigsberger, Suggestions for Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure , (1941) 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 1010. But cf. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (M.D.Ga. 1943) 52 F.Supp. 177. Moreover, in any case where the plaintiff could not have joined the third party originally because of jurisdictional limitations such as lack of diversity of citizenship, the majority view is that any attempt by the plaintiff to amend his complaint and assert a claim against the impleaded third party would be unavailing. Hoskie v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lorrac Real Estate Corp. (E.D.N.Y. 1941) 39 F.Supp. 305; Johnson v. G. J. Sherrard Co. v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. (D.Mass. 1941) 5 Fed.Rules Serv. 14a.511, Case 1, 2 F.R.D. 164; Thompson v. Cranston (W.D.N.Y. 1942) 6 Fed.Rules Serv. 14a.511, Case 1, 2 F.R.D. 270, aff'd (C.C.A.2d, 1942) 132 F.(2d) 631, cert. den. (1943) 319 U.S. 741; Friend v. Middle Atlantic Transportation Co. (C.C.A.2d, 1946) 153 F.(2d) 778, cert. den. (1946) 66 S.Ct. 1370; Herrington v. Jones (E.D.La. 1941) 5 Fed.Rules Serv. 14a.511, Case 2, 2 F.R.D. 108; Banks v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp. v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp. (W.D.Mo. 1943) 7 Fed.Rules Serv. 14a.11, Case 2; Saunders v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. (S.D.W.Va. 1945) 9 Fed.Rules Serv. 14a.62, Case 2; Hull v. United States Rubber Co. v. Johnson Larsen & Co. (E.D.Mich. 1945) 9 Fed.Rules Serv. 14a.62, Case 3. See also concurring opinion of Circuit Judge Minton in People of State of Illinois for use of Trust Co. of Chicago v. Maryland Casualty Co. (C.C.A.7th, 1942) 132 F.(2d) 850, 853. Contra: Sklar v. Hayes v. Singer (E.D.Pa. 1941) 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 14a.511, Case 2, 1 F.R.D. 594. Discussion of the problem will be found in Commentary, Amendment of Plaintiff's Pleading to Assert Claim Against Third-Party Defendant (1942) 5 Fed.Rules Serv. 811; Commentary, Federal Jurisdiction in Third-Party Practice (1943) 6 Fed.Rules Serv. 766; Holtzoff, Some Problems Under Federal Third-Party Practice(1941) 3 La.L.Rev. 408, 419–420; 1. Moore's Federal Practice (1938) Cum.Supplement §14.08. For these reasons therefore, the words “or to the plaintiff” in the first sentence of subdivision (a) have been removed by the amendment; and in conformance therewith the words “the plaintiff” in the second sentence of the subdivision, and the words “or to the third-party plaintiff” in the concluding sentence thereof have likewise been eliminated. 

Illinois Supreme Court Rules require the defendants to be informed of all matters regarding the complaint, court filings, and rulings by their attorney.  

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 1.4 - Communication 

(a) A lawyer shall:(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these Rules;(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 1.0 - Terminology  

(e) "Informed consent" denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct. 

Informed Consent 

[6] Many of the Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2(c), 1.6(a) and 1.7(b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the Rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. 

[7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. Rule 1.5(f) requires that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. For a definition of "writing" and "confirmed in writing," see paragraphs (n) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See Rules 1.5(d)(2) and (d)(5) and, Rule 1.8(a) and (g). For a definition of "signed," see paragraph (n). 

On December 11, 2023, Raymond Fabricius stated that the defendants are aware of all facts surrounding this complaint and are perfectly happy with their representation by him and by the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2. 

On December 11, 2023, Plaintiff 1 final settlement demand was denied on behalf of the minor by Judge Noll. Plaintiff 1 informed the court that the Next Friend must be stricken from all filings on the minor’s 18th birthday and requested to amend his complaint since a minor would no longer be involved in this complaint to add the rest of the defendants.  

Rather, when a minor is involved, "the *** court has a duty to prevent the rejection of settlement offers which in the minor's best interests should be accepted" and, should this impede upon the minor's guardian or parents' ability to control the direction of the case, then so be it. Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 573 

Additionally, a court will appoint a GAL to review and complete a settlement offer that is in the best interests of the minor, if the next friend rejects such an offer or refuses to follow through on it. (Will v. Northwestern Univ., 378 Ill.App.3d 280, 294 (1st Dist. 2007); Ott by Ott v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 273 Ill.App.3d 563, 571 (1st Dist. 1995)) 

On December 26, 2023, Plaintiff 1 had a personal family emergency and filed the ninth amended complaint early and stated as much on the record.  

On January 16, 2024, Christine Anto who has personally aided in the fraudulent misrepresentations/concealment and was named as an individual who assisted in the occurrence in the Ninth Amended Complaint filed an Appearance for the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 not for any defendant named by the plaintiffs in attempt to harass and interfere with the plaintiff’s right to petition. 

On February 13, 2024, Christine Anto filed an Affidavit into the record that contained blatantly false material information regarding corporate structure for the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2.  

On February 21, 2024, the court allowed Christine Anto to file onto the record an affidavit by Peter Lecleir, with knowingly false information after being given direct evidence and proof of the misrepresentation.  

On February 21, 2024, this court allowed a third party to interfere with the Plaintiffs’ right to petition this judicial branch for harm caused to them by others. 

Parent 1 and Parent 2 had full knowledge of the acts being perpetrated on their behalf and allowed their representatives to continue these acts.  

(720 ILCS 5/4-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-5)  
    Sec. 4-5. Knowledge. A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:  
        (a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his or, her conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that his or her conduct is of that nature or that those circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that the fact exists.  

        (b) The result of his or her conduct, described by, the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that that result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct. Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully, within the meaning of a statute using the term "willfully", unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.  
    When the law provides that acting knowingly suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally.  
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.) 

By allowing their representatives to perform these acts, they have aided and agreed with the commission of the previously stated acts and therefore accountable for them.  

Any future acts will be added to testimony and evidence in real time without amending the complaint further. All information in this complaint was shared with all representatives of the defendants and was shared in statements on the court record. At the time of this filing of this Eleventh Amended Complaint, Minor is no longer a minor.  

 "Minor" means a person who has not attained the age of 18 years. A person who has attained the age of 18 years is of legal age for all purposes except as otherwise provided in the Illinois Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. 

A minor generally cannot enter into a legally binding contract with a lawyer. However, they can still receive legal representation through other means, such as through a parent or guardian or court-appointed attorneys. 

Plaintiff 2and Plaintiff 1 understand the intended victim of many of these crimes was Victim 1. This court, Raymond Fabricius, Christine Anto, the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2’s inability to properly communicate or willingness to listen have caused them to miss who the actual victims are. Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 shielded Victim 1 from these crimes and prevented the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 from harming someone in their care. Victim 1 did not suffer because of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 actions, Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 1 did. Their intent was clear, to use Victim 1 as leverage against Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2. 

These constant interruptions and interference with the plaintiffs and their businesses have caused massive economic losses and caused immeasurable damage. The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 has refused all settlement offers on behalf of all and has yet to cover any of the losses sustained by Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 nearly a year and a half after the accident. The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 interference in the lives of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 has only caused harm to them and their businesses.  

Plaintiffs will take a literal view of the law and argue that. Any actions that prevent an individual from justice is a violation of their constitutional rights. Any action performed that is defined as a violation of the law is ongoing harassment of the Plaintiffs.  

(720 ILCS 5/5-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 5-2) 
Sec. 5-2. When accountability exists. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when: 
(a) having a mental state described by the statute defining the offense, he or she causes another to perform the conduct, and the other person in fact or by reason of legal incapacity lacks such a mental state; 
(c) either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid that other person in the planning or commission of the offense.When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of those further acts. Mere presence at the scene of a crime does not render a person accountable for an offense; a person's presence at the scene of a crime, however, may be considered with other circumstances by the trier of fact when determining accountability. 
A person is not so accountable, however, unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if: 
(1) he or she is a victim of the offense committed; 
(2) the offense is so defined that his or her conduct was inevitably incident to its commission; or 
(3) before the commission of the offense, he or she terminates his or her effort to promote or facilitate that commission and does one of the following: (i) wholly deprives his or her prior efforts of effectiveness in that commission, (ii) gives timely warning to the proper law enforcement authorities, or (iii) otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense. 
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.) 

Count I and II – Negligence in Operation of a Motor Vehicle (Minor) 

Minor has a duty to the Plaintiff and all other motorists on the roadway to follow the Rules of the Road and Illinois State Law while operating a motor vehicle on any roadway in Illinois. 

Minor was distracted and failed to stop her vehicle in time to avoid impacting the vehicle Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 1 were in. 

Minor failed to operate the vehicle in accordance with Illinois law or fulfill her duty to other motorists on Illinois roadways. Minor’s willful disregard for others in the way she was driving, and, in the condition, she was driving in is a factor to be considered. 

As a result of Minor’s vehicle impacting the vehicle the plaintiff, Plaintiff 2, was driving, the 2019 Jeep Cherokee was totaled due to excessive damage and frame damage. 

As a result of Minor’s vehicle impacting the vehicle the plaintiff was driving, Plaintiff 2 received numerous injuries that prevented her from taking on her full work duties for numerous months. 

As a result of Minor’s vehicle impacting the vehicle the plaintiff was a passenger in, Plaintiff 1 received minor injuries that prevented him from safely working for the next two days. 

Count III – Negligence Resulting from Neglect as Medical Personal Representative  

(Parent 2) 

Parent 2 signed the Driver’s License Application for Mior when applying for a driver’s license for a minor for the first time.  

The parent who signs the Driver’s License Application has the power to revoke the minor’s license at any point until the minor’s 18th birthday. 

On the State of Illinois Application for Driver’s License, an applicant must answer a series of questions before obtaining a driver’s license and in the case of a minor, a parent must confirm all information is correct since it is a legal binding document and minors cannot enter a contract.  

Question #7 on the State of Illinois Application for Driver’s License asks, “Do you have any mental or physical condition that might interfere with Safe Driving?” 

On Minor’s Driver’s License Application, the answer was marked “N” for no and Parent 2 confirmed this to be correct. 

If question #7 is answered “Yes” the application states “If yes, a physician’s statement and a signed medical agreement are required.” 

An affirmative response on question #7 and an applicant does not have medical clearance to drive will result in the Illinois Secretary of State refusing to issue a driver’s license until forms are provided. 

This also establishes a duty to motorists at time of application and in future that if someone receives an injury that might interfere with safe driving such as major injuries to legs, arms or eyes, then the driver’s license is suspended until medical clearance is established. 

Minor had previous injuries and Minor was wearing a knee brace that might prevent full range of motion for her leg. 

The Emergency Brake in this vehicle was on the left under the dash. The emergency brake in this vehicle requires use of the left leg to be able to operate. 

(625 ILCS 5/12-301) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-301) 
   Sec. 12-301. Brakes. 
    (a) Brake equipment required. 

 1. Every motor vehicle, other than a motor-driven cycle, an antique vehicle displaying an antique plate, and an expanded-use antique vehicle displaying expanded-use antique vehicle plates, when operated upon a highway shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control the movement of and to stop and hold such vehicle, including 2 separate means of applying the brakes, each of which means shall be effective to apply the brakes to at least one wheel on a motorcycle and at least 2 wheels on all other first division and second division vehicles. If these 2 separate means of applying the brakes are connected in any way, they shall be so constructed that failure of any one part of the operating mechanism shall not leave the motor vehicle without brakes. 

Statements made at the scene and on TIKTOK make clear that Minor had numerous injuries to both of her legs, many were serious injuries that required surgery to correct. 

Parent 2 is a registered nurse, licensed in Illinois since (REDACTED).  

Based on statements at scene Parent 2 had full knowledge of previous injuries, doctor’s appointments and upcoming surgery for Minor. 

Parent 2 and Parent 1 are responsible for all medical concerns that Minor may encounter until her 18th birthday. 

Under Illinois law, a minor is a person who has not attained the age of 18 years. In general, a minor cannot consent to medical treatment, and a parent, guardian, or person in loco parentis must consent to the treatment of a minor. 

As parents, Parent 1 and Parent 2 are medical representatives for Minor.  

Privacy Rule at 45 CFR 164.502 

(3)(i) Implementation specification: Unemancipated minors. If under applicable law a parent, guardian, or other person acting in loco parentis has authority to act on behalf of an individual who is an unemancipated minor in making decisions related to health care, a covered entity must treat such person as a personal representative. 

Parent 1 and Parent 2 have shown negligence in their duties as Minor’s medical personal representatives and are liable for that neglect.  

(705 ILCS 405/2-3) (from Ch. 37, par. 802-3) Sec. 2-3. Neglected or abused minor. 

 (1) Those who are neglected include: (a) any minor under 18 years of age who is not receiving the proper or necessary support, education as required by law, or medical or other remedial care recognized under State law as necessary for a minor's well-being, or other care necessary for his or her well-being 

By allowing a minor to drive before being cleared by a qualified licensed physician, Parent 1 and Parent 2 are responsible for the actions of the minor when operating a motor vehicle. 

Privacy Rule at 45 CFR 164.502 

(g)(1)A covered entity must … treat a personal representative as the individual. 

Parent 2 has a duty to Minor to address her medical needs and to be able to make educated decisions based on medical diagnosis. This duty includes enforcing medical restrictions on Minor and verifying Minor is cleared to drive by a doctor before allowing Minor to operate any motor vehicle on any roadway after an injury. 

This duty extends to other motorists if medical advice restricts the ability to operate a motor vehicle. Broken leg or Torn ACL have certain guidelines before a doctor will clear anyone to drive. 

Based on statements by Minor, pressing as hard as Minor could and little slowing, it suggests Minor may not have been able to apply pressure on her leg. 

Based on statements by Minor, driving on cruise control, releasing the brake prior to collision, and prior injuries suggests Minor could not maintain prolonged pressure on Minor’s leg. 

As parents, Parent 1 and Parent 2 have the ability, legal authority, and responsibility to stop Minor from driving if there is just cause. Problems operating a vehicle in a safe manner or medical issues that prevent safe operation are responsibilities that the parents have a duty to address.  

By letting Minor drive with all the previously stated problems that prevented the minor from operating the vehicle in a safe manner, Parent 2 failed to uphold her duty to other motorists by allowing Minor to operate any motor vehicle when Minor could no longer do so safely. 

Parent 2 has shown an utter indifference and conscious disregard for the safety of others and their property. 

Parent 2 has consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow. 

As a result, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 were injured from Parent 2’s failure to prevent Minor from driving a motor vehicle when Minor was incapable of doing so safely. 

As a parent/guardian of Minor and responsible for her medical care, Parent 1 shares some of the liability for this accident. 

735 ILCS 5/2-1117) (from Ch. 110, par. 2-1117) 
    Sec. 2-1117. Joint liability. Except as provided in Section 2-1118, in actions on account of bodily injury or death or physical damage to property, based on negligence, or product liability based on strict tort liability, all defendants found liable are jointly and severally liable for plaintiff's past and future medical and medically related expenses. Any defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is less than 25% of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third-party defendant except the plaintiff's employer, shall be severally liable for all other damages. Any defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is 25% or greater of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third-party defendants except the plaintiff's employer, shall be jointly and severally liable for all other damages. 

Count IV – Negligence Resulting from Neglect as a Medical Personal Representative 

 (Parent 1) 

Minor had previous injuries and Minor was wearing a knee brace that might prevent full range of motion for her leg. 

The Emergency Brake in this vehicle was on the left under the dash. The emergency brake in this vehicle requires use of the left leg to be able to operate. 

(625 ILCS 5/12-301) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-301) 
   Sec. 12-301. Brakes. 
    (a) Brake equipment required. 

 1. Every motor vehicle, other than a motor-driven cycle, an antique vehicle displaying an antique plate, and an expanded-use antique vehicle displaying expanded-use antique vehicle plates, when operated upon a highway shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control the movement of and to stop and hold such vehicle, including 2 separate means of applying the brakes, each of which means shall be effective to apply the brakes to at least one wheel on a motorcycle and at least 2 wheels on all other first division and second division vehicles. If these 2 separate means of applying the brakes are connected in any way, they shall be so constructed that failure of any one part of the operating mechanism shall not leave the motor vehicle without brakes. 

Statements made at the scene and on TIKTOK make clear that Minor had numerous injuries to both of Minor’s legs, many were serious injuries that required surgery to correct. 

Based on statements at scene Parent 1 had full knowledge of previous injuries, doctor’s appointments and upcoming surgery for Minor. 

Parent 1 and Parent 2 are responsible for all medical concerns that Minor may encounter until her 18th birthday. 

Under Illinois law, a minor is a person who has not attained the age of 18 years. In general, a minor cannot consent to medical treatment, and a parent, guardian, or person in loco parentis must consent to the treatment of a minor. 

As parents, Parent 1 and Parent 2 are medical representatives for Minor. 

Privacy Rule at 45 CFR 164.502 

(3)(i) Implementation specification: Unemancipated minors. If under applicable law a parent, guardian, or other person acting in loco parentis has authority to act on behalf of an individual who is an unemancipated minor in making decisions related to health care, a covered entity must treat such person as a personal representative. 

Parent 1 and Parent 2 have shown negligence in their duties as Minor’s medical personal representatives and are liable for that neglect.  

(705 ILCS 405/2-3) (from Ch. 37, par. 802-3) Sec. 2-3. Neglected or abused minor. 

 (1) Those who are neglected include: (a) any minor under 18 years of age who is not receiving the proper or necessary support, education as required by law, or medical or other remedial care recognized under State law as necessary for a minor's well-being, or other care necessary for his or her well-being 

By allowing a minor to drive before being cleared by a qualified licensed physician, Parent 2 and Parent 1 are responsible for the actions of the minor when operating a motor vehicle. 

Privacy Rule at 45 CFR 164.502 

(g)(1)A covered entity must … treat a personal representative as the individual. 

Parent 1 has a duty to Minor to address Minor’s medical needs and to be able to make educated decisions based on medical diagnosis. This duty includes enforcing medical restrictions on Minor and verifying she is cleared to drive by a doctor before allowing Minor to operate any motor vehicle on any roadway after an injury. 

This duty extends to other motorists if medical advice restricts the ability to operate a motor vehicle. Broken leg or Torn ACL have certain guidelines before a doctor will clear anyone to drive. 

Based on statements by Minor, pressing as hard as Minor could and a little slowing, it suggests Minor may not have been able to apply pressure on Minor’s leg. 

Based on statements by Minor, driving on cruise control, releasing the brake prior to collision, and prior injuries suggests Minor could not maintain prolonged pressure on Minor’s leg. 

As parents, Parent 1 and Parent 2 have the ability, legal authority, and responsibility to stop Minor from driving if there is just cause. Problems operating a vehicle in a safe manner or medical issues that prevent safe operation are responsibilities that the parents have a duty to address.  

By letting Minor drive with all the previously stated problems that prevented the minor from operating the vehicle in a safe manner, Parent 1 failed to uphold his duty to other motorists by allowing Minor to operate any motor vehicle when Minor could no longer do so safely. 

Parent 1 has shown an utter indifference and conscious disregard for the safety of others and their property. 

Parent 1 has consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow. 

As a result, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 were injured from Parent 1’s failure to prevent Minor from driving a motor vehicle when Minor was incapable of doing so safely. 

As a parent/guardian of Minor and responsible for Minor’s medical care, Parent 1 shares some of the liability for this accident. 

735 ILCS 5/2-1117) (from Ch. 110, par. 2-1117) 
    Sec. 2-1117. Joint liability. Except as provided in Section 2-1118, in actions on account of bodily injury or death or physical damage to property, based on negligence, or product liability based on strict tort liability, all defendants found liable are jointly and severally liable for plaintiff's past and future medical and medically related expenses. Any defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is less than 25% of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third-party defendant except the plaintiff's employer, shall be severally liable for all other damages. Any defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is 25% or greater of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third-party defendants except the plaintiff's employer, shall be jointly and severally liable for all other damages. 

Count V – Negligence for Minor Willful and Wanton Conduct (Parent 2)  

((740 ILCS 115/1) Parental Responsibility Act) 

Minor and Parent 2 have shown an utter indifference and conscious disregard for the safety of others and their property. 

(745 ILCS 10/1-210) (from Ch. 85, par. 1-210)  
    Sec. 1-210. "Willful and wanton conduct" as used in this Act means a course of action which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property. This definition shall apply in any case where a "willful and wanton" exception is incorporated into any immunity under this Act.  
(Source: P.A. 90-805, eff. 12-2-98.)   

As a Parent of Minor, Parent 2 is responsible for the willful and wanton conduct of Minor.  

(740 ILCS 115/3) (from Ch. 70, par. 53)  
    Sec. 3. Liability. The parent or legal guardian of an unemancipated minor who resides with such parent or legal guardian is liable for actual damages for the willful or malicious acts of such minor which cause injury to a person or property, including damages caused by a minor who has been adjudicated a delinquent for violating Section 21-1.3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012. Reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to any plaintiff in any action under this Act. If the plaintiff is a governmental unit, reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded up to $15,000.  
    The changes to this Section made by this amendatory Act of the 95th General Assembly apply to causes of action accruing on or after its effective date.  
(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)   

Count VI – Negligence for Minor Willful and Wanton Conduct (Parent 1)  

((740 ILCS 115/1) Parental Responsibility Act) 

Minor and Parent 1 have shown an utter indifference and conscious disregard for the safety of others and their property. 

(745 ILCS 10/1-210) (from Ch. 85, par. 1-210)  
    Sec. 1-210. "Willful and wanton conduct" as used in this Act means a course of action which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property. This definition shall apply in any case where a "willful and wanton" exception is incorporated into any immunity under this Act.  
(Source: P.A. 90-805, eff. 12-2-98.)   

As a Parent of Minor, Parent 1 is responsible for the willful and wanton conduct of Minor. 

(740 ILCS 115/3) (from Ch. 70, par. 53)  
    Sec. 3. Liability. The parent or legal guardian of an unemancipated minor who resides with such parent or legal guardian is liable for actual damages for the willful or malicious acts of such minor which cause injury to a person or property, including damages caused by a minor who has been adjudicated a delinquent for violating Section 21-1.3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012. Reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to any plaintiff in any action under this Act. If the plaintiff is a governmental unit, reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded up to $15,000.  
    The changes to this Section made by this amendatory Act of the 95th General Assembly apply to causes of action accruing on or after its effective date.  
(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)   

Count VII – Negligent Entrustment (Parent 1) 

Parent 1 willfully allowed Minor to drive a vehicle registered and insured in his name with knowledge of previous issues with proper braking of the vehicle and previous injuries that prevented the safe operation of his vehicle.  

“Illinois has long recognized the tort of negligent entrustment.“ State Farm Fire Casualty Co. V. McGlawn (1980), 84 Ill. App.3d 107, 110, 404 N.E.2d 1122, 1124, 

“There is a duty upon the owner to deny permission to another to drive his automobile for his own purposes when he knows such person is an incompetent or reckless driver or by the exercise of reasonable diligence he could have known of such incompetency or recklessness. (Bensman v. Reed (1939),299 Ill.App.531,20 N.E.2d 910) 

The Emergency brake for this vehicle was located on the left under dash. The Emergency brake in this vehicle requires use of the left leg to be able to operate.  

(625 ILCS 5/12-301) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-301)   
   Sec. 12-301. Brakes.   
    (a) Brake equipment required.   

1. Every motor vehicle... when operated upon a highway shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control the movement of and to stop and hold such vehicle, including 2 separate means of applying the brakes, each of which means shall be effective to apply the brakes to ... 2 wheels on all other first division and second division vehicles. If these 2 separate means of applying the brakes are connected in any way, they shall be so constructed that failure of any one part of the operating mechanism shall not leave the motor vehicle without brakes.  

By letting Minor drive a vehicle registered in his name with all the previously stated problems that prevented the minor from operating the vehicle in a safe manner, Parent 1 failed to uphold his duty to other motorists by allowing Minor to operate his motor vehicle when Minor could no longer do so safely.  

As owner/policyholder of the vehicle and parent/guardian of Minor, Parent 1 shares some of the liability for this accident. 

735 ILCS 5/2-1117) (from Ch. 110, par. 2-1117) 

An action for negligent entrustment "consists of entrusting a dangerous article to another whom the lender knows, or should know, is likely to use it in a manner involving an unreasonable risk of harm to others." Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60 (2001). 

Count VIII – Negligence for Improper Maintenance of Vehicle Driven on Illinois Roadway  

(Parent 1) 

Comments made in Law Enforcement bodycam video footage immediately following the accident suggest that there was an issue with the brake pedal in the vehicle driven by Minor.   

(625 ILCS 5/12-301) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-301) 
   Sec. 12-301. Brakes. 
    (a) Brake equipment required. 

1. Every motor vehicle, other than a motor-driven cycle, an antique vehicle displaying an antique plate, and an expanded-use antique vehicle displaying expanded-use antique vehicle plates, when operated upon a highway shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control the movement of and to stop and hold such vehicle, including 2 separate means of applying the brakes, each of which means shall be effective to apply the brakes to at least one wheel on a motorcycle and at least 2 wheels on all other first division and second division vehicles. If these 2 separate means of applying the brakes are connected in any way, they shall be so constructed that failure of any one part of the operating mechanism shall not leave the motor vehicle without brakes. 

Parent 1 is named as registered owner on accident report of the vehicle driven by Minor in above stated car accident. 

One essential element of the negligent entrustment cause of action is that persons charged with liability have a superior right to control the property at issue. Umble v. Sandy McKie and Sons, Inc., 294 Ill. App. 3d 449 (1998). 

Parent 1 and Minor are named on the insurance policy according to insurance carrier of the vehicle driven by Minor in above stated car accident. 

As owner/policyholder of vehicle, Parent 1 is responsible for making sure the vehicle registered in his name is safe to be driven on roadways and properly maintained before allowing others to drive said vehicle on any roadway where it can endanger others. 

(625 ILCS 5/12-301) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-301) 
   Sec. 12-301. Brakes. 
(b) Performance ability of brakes.  

1. The service brakes.... shall be adequate to stop such vehicle … when traveling 20 miles per hour within a distance of 30 feet... 

5. All brakes shall be maintained in good working order … 

As owner/policyholder of the vehicle in this occurrence and parent/guardian of Minor, Parent 1 shares some of the liability for this accident. 

735 ILCS 5/2-1117) (from Ch. 110, par. 2-1117) 
    Sec. 2-1117. Joint liability. Except as provided in Section 2-1118, in actions on account of bodily injury or death or physical damage to property, based on negligence, or product liability based on strict tort liability, all defendants found liable are jointly and severally liable for plaintiff's past and future medical and medically related expenses. Any defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is less than 25% of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third-party defendant except the plaintiff's employer, shall be severally liable for all other damages. Any defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is 25% or greater of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third-party defendants except the plaintiff's employer, shall be jointly and severally liable for all other damages. 

Count IX – Spoilation of Evidence 

(Minor) 

Plaintiff 1 filed a motion to compel an independent attorney for Minor on November 17, 2022, referring to TIKTOK videos referred to in this complaint made the day after the vehicle accident. This video was live at the time of filing motion and at the time of the hearing for the motion to compel and the Plaintiffs will testify to as much and will show documented evidence of this fact. 

Line 24 of the sixth amended complaint states “On August 20, 2022, Minor posted a TIKTOK video with the caption “Don’t skip this sound I just got in a 60 mile car crash and totaled my car 3 days before junior year and have to get a ACL miniscus and bone knee reconstruction in 2 weeks”.”. 

On 06-12-2023 Parent 2 responded for Minor and answered the sixth amended complaint. Line 24 of this complaint referred to the TIKTOK post on 08-20-2022 mentioned above and the Minor’s answer was “, admits to making certain posts on social media and states that said posts speak for themselves” and goes on to state “, lacks sufficient information to form an opinion as to the truth or falsity of the allegations set forth in Paragraph 24 of Complaint (sic) 1 of the Sixth Amended Complaint”. 

In responses to interrogatories, Parent 2 responded for Minor and stated “Minor posted a TIKTOK video on 08-20-2022 stating Minor had a crappy summer because she tore her ACL in her left knee and she also totaled her car in the same summer. Minor took the video down that week.” 

Minor erased videos mentioned in this complaint shortly after Plaintiff, Plaintiff 1, referred to them in a filed court motion. 

Parent 1 and Parent 2 also paid others to steal and destroy evidence vital to this complaint. Parts from the vehicle driven by Plaintiff 2 in this occurrence removed from her vehicle without authorization and have been kept from the owners. 

  Count X – Spoilation of Evidence 

(Parent 2) 

Plaintiff 1 filed a motion to compel an independent attorney for Minor on November 17, 2022, referring to TIKTOK videos referred to in this complaint made the day after the vehicle accident. This video was live at the time of filing motion and at the time of the hearing for the motion to compel and the Plaintiffs will testify to as much and will show documented evidence of this fact. 

Line 24 of the sixth amended complaint states “On August 20, 2022, Minor posted a TIKTOK video with the caption “Don’t skip this sound I just got in a 60 mile car crash and totaled my car 3 days before junior year and have to get a ACL miniscus and bone knee reconstruction in 2 weeks”.”. 

On 06-12-2023 Parent 1 responded for Minor and answered the sixth amended complaint. Line 24 of this complaint referred to the TIKTOK post on 08-20-2022 mentioned above and the Minor’s answer was “, admits to making certain posts on social media and states that said posts speak for themselves” and goes on to state “, lacks sufficient information to form an opinion as to the truth or falsity of the allegations set forth in Paragraph 24 of Complaint (sic) 1 of the Sixth Amended Complaint”. 

In responses to interrogatories, Parent 2 responded for Minor and stated “Minor posted a TIKTOK video on 08-20-2022 stating she had a crappy summer because she tore her ACL in her left knee and she also totaled her car in the same summer. She took the video down that week.” 

Parent 2, acting as “Next Friend” of Minor allowed Minor to erase videos referred to in this complaint after the plaintiff, Plaintiff 1, referred to them in a filed court motion. Parent 2 was also destroying evidence that would implicate her in other counts. 

Parent 2 and Parent 1 also paid others to steal and destroy evidence vital to this complaint. Parts from the vehicle driven by Plaintiff 2 in this occurrence were removed from her vehicle without authorization and have been kept from the owners. 

Count XI – Spoilation of Evidence 

(Parent 1) 

Plaintiff 1 filed a motion to compel an independent attorney for Minor on November 17, 2022, referring to TIKTOK videos referred to in this complaint made the day after the vehicle accident. This video was live at the time of filing motion and at the time of the hearing for the motion to compel and the Plaintiffs will testify to as much and will show documented evidence of this fact. 

Line 24 of the sixth amended complaint states “On August 20, 2022, Minor posted a TIKTOK video with the caption “Don’t skip this sound I just got in a 60 mile car crash and totaled my car 3 days before junior year and have to get a ACL miniscus and bone knee reconstruction in 2 weeks”.”. 

On 06-12-2023 Parent 2 responded for Minor and answered the sixth amended complaint. Line 24 of this complaint referred to the TIKTOK post on 08-20-2022 mentioned above and the Minor’s answer was “, admits to making certain posts on social media and states that said posts speak for themselves” and goes on to state “, lacks sufficient information to form an opinion as to the truth or falsity of the allegations set forth in Paragraph 24 of Complaint (sic) 1 of the Sixth Amended Complaint”. 

In responses to interrogatories, Parent 2 acting responded for Minor and stated “Minor posted a TIKTOK video on 08-20-2022 stating she had a crappy summer because she tore her ACL in her left knee and she also totaled her car in the same summer. She took the video down that week.” 

Parent 1 as a guardian/parent of Minor and as a named defendant allowed Parent 2 and Minor to erase videos referred to in this complaint after the plaintiff, Plaintiff 1, referred to them in a filed court motion that was evidence for negligent entrustment and other counts against him. 

Parent 2 and Parent 1 also paid others to steal and destroy evidence vital to this complaint. Parts from the vehicle driven by Plaintiff 2 in this occurrence were removed from her vehicle without authorization and have been kept from the owners.   

Count XII – Civil Conspiracy (Parent 2) 

Parent 2 and Parent 1 and those paid to perform acts in this occurrence for them have all assisted in all acts referred to in this occurrence together. According to Raymond Fabricius, Parent 2 is happy and satisfied with the actions of his personal representatives and is fully aware of all the actions performed on his behalf. 

Count XIII – Civil Conspiracy (Parent 1) 

Parent 2 and Parent 1 and those paid to perform acts in this occurrence for them have all assisted in all acts referred to in this occurrence together. According to Raymond Fabricius, Parent 1 is happy and satisfied with the actions of his personal representatives and is fully aware of all the actions performed on her behalf. 

Count XIV – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Parent 2)  

The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 constant intentional harassment and intimidation of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 stated in the occurrence has caused constant stress from limitations on work, excess financial burden, and constant interruptions in their businesses. 

 Count XV – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Parent 1)  

The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 constant intentional harassment and intimidation of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 stated in the occurrence has caused constant stress from limitations on work, excess financial burden, and constant interruptions in their businesses. 

Count XVI – Loss of Enjoyment of Life (Parent 2) 

Due to constant interferences in their personal lives as a direct result of the vehicle accident with Minor and the constant harassment by Parent 2 and her personal representatives acting on her behalf, the personal and professional lives of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 have suffered as a result. 

Count XVII – Loss of Enjoyment of Life (Parent 1) 

Due to constant interferences in their personal lives as a direct result of the vehicle accident with Minor and the constant harassment by Parent 1 and his personal representatives acting on his behalf, the personal and professional lives of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 have suffered as a result. 

Count XVIII – Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (Parent 2) 

As a result of Parent 2 assisting, agreeing, and aiding with constant interferences in the lives of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have been prevented from working. As the only two employees of their businesses, whenever Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 are prevented from working, their businesses are closed. Due to these constant interferences, they caused severe losses and multiple projects were cancelled as a result. 

Under Illinois law, the elements of a claim for tortious interference with business relationships, more commonly called tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, are that: • The plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of entering into or continuing a valid business relationship with a third party. • The defendant knew of that expectation. • The defendant intentionally and without justification interfered with that expectation. • The defendant’s interference prevented the plaintiff’s legitimate expectancy from ripening into a valid business relationship (Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 483-84 (1998)). • The plaintiff suffered damages because of the interference. (Voyles v. Sandia Mortg. Corp., 196 Ill. 2d 288, 300-01 (2001).) Courts and litigants in Illinois also refer to this claim as tortious interference with business expectancy. 

Count XIX – Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (Parent 1) 

As a result of Parent 1 assisting, agreeing, and aiding with constant interferences in the lives of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have been prevented from working. As the only two employees of their businesses, whenever Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 are prevented from working, their businesses are closed. Due to these constant interferences, they caused severe losses and multiple projects were cancelled as a result.   

Under Illinois law, the elements of a claim for tortious interference with business relationships, more commonly called tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, are that: • The plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of entering into or continuing a valid business relationship with a third party. • The defendant knew of that expectation. • The defendant intentionally and without justification interfered with that expectation. • The defendant’s interference prevented the plaintiff’s legitimate expectancy from ripening into a valid business relationship (Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 483-84 (1998)). • The plaintiff suffered damages because of the interference. (Voyles v. Sandia Mortg. Corp., 196 Ill. 2d 288, 300-01 (2001).) Courts and litigants in Illinois also refer to this claim as tortious interference with business expectancy. 

Count XX – Tortious Interference with a Contract (Parent 2) 

Parent 2 and those paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 had full knowledge of the contract between Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2. 

Parent 2 and those paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 had full knowledge full knowledge of the contract with owner of property where the vehicle was to be returned and willfully violated that contract and violating the agreement between Plaintiff 1 and the defendants. 

As a direct result of actions performed in this courtroom a contract between Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 was violated as result of individuals performing a service for Minor, Parent 1, and Parent 2. 

Parent 2 and those paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 violated the agreement for the return of the vehicle which caused excess losses to the Plaintiffs and their businesses. 

Under Illinois law, the elements of a claim for tortious interference with a contract are that: • The plaintiff and a third party entered into a valid and enforceable contract. • The defendant knew of the contract. • The defendant intentionally and unjustifiably induced the third party to breach the contract. • The defendant’s wrongful conduct caused the third party to breach the contract. • The plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the breach of the contract. (HPI Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 145, 154-55 (1989).) Courts and litigants in Illinois sometimes refer to a tortious interference with contract claim as a claim for either: • Tortious interference with contractual relations. • Tortious interference with contractual business relationships 

Count XXI – Tortious Interference with a Contract (Parent 1) 

Parent 1 and those paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 had full knowledge of the contract between Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2. 

Parent 1 and those paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 had full knowledge of the contract with the owner of property where the vehicle was to be returned and willfully violated that contract and violating the agreement between Plaintiff 1 and the defendants. 

As a direct result of actions performed in this courtroom a contract between Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 was violated as result of individuals performing a service for Minor, Parent 1, and Parent 2. 

Parent 1 and those paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 violated the agreement for the return of the vehicle which caused excess losses to the Plaintiffs and their businesses. 

Under Illinois law, the elements of a claim for tortious interference with a contract are that: • The plaintiff and a third party entered into a valid and enforceable contract. • The defendant knew of the contract. • The defendant intentionally and unjustifiably induced the third party to breach the contract. • The defendant’s wrongful conduct caused the third party to breach the contract. • The plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the breach of the contract. (HPI Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 145, 154-55 (1989).) Courts and litigants in Illinois sometimes refer to a tortious interference with contract claim as a claim for either: • Tortious interference with contractual relations. • Tortious interference with contractual business relationships 

Count XXII – Conversion (Parent 2) 

Due to the actions of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 while performing a service for Parent 2, Plaintiff 2was forced to find a vehicle for her and her mother to use. 

Due to the actions of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2, Plaintiff 2 was unable to replace her vehicle or file an insurance claim with her own insurance company for a year. 

These acts caused a severe economic burden on Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2, and their businesses as a result. 

Conversion is the deprivation of another’s right to use or possess personal property. Note that the property at issue is not "real property” which, in turn, is usually defined as land and attached improvements on land. All other property is generally considered “personal property” or “chattels.” Rights to creative property and artistic creations involves protection of “intellectual property” and is discussed in our articles on copyright. Conversion is often defined as other interference of a person’s right to property without the owner’s consent and without lawful justification. Stevenson v. Economy Bank of Ambridge, 413 Pa. 442 (Pa. 1964). A conversion occurs when a person without authority or permission intentionally takes the personal property of another or deprives another of possession of personal property. It is a tort which allows the injured party to seek legal relief. 

Count XXIII – Conversion (Parent 1) 

Due to the actions of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 while performing a service for Parent 1, Plaintiff 2 was forced to find a vehicle for her and her mother to use. 

Due to the actions of the company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2, Plaintiff 2 was unable to replace her vehicle or file an insurance claim with her own insurance company for a year. 

These acts caused a severe economic burden on Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2, and their businesses as a result. 

Conversion is the deprivation of another’s right to use or possess personal property. Note that the property at issue is not "real property” which, in turn, is usually defined as land and attached improvements on land. All other property is generally considered “personal property” or “chattels.” Rights to creative property and artistic creations involves protection of “intellectual property” and is discussed in our articles on copyright. Conversion is often defined as other interference of a person’s right to property without the owner’s consent and without lawful justification. Stevenson v. Economy Bank of Ambridge, 413 Pa. 442 (Pa. 1964). A conversion occurs when a person without authority or permission intentionally takes the personal property of another or deprives another of possession of personal property. It is a tort which allows the injured party to seek legal relief. 

Count XXIV and XXVI – Fraudulent Misrepresentations and Fraudulent Concealment (Parent 2) 

The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 and those acting on their behalf or employed inside their corporation and subsidiaries have made numerous misrepresentations regarding material facts to the plaintiffs. There are too many instances to list.  

“Fraud may consist in the concealment of what is true as well as the assertion of what is false where the concealment is shown to have been done with the intention to deceive under circumstances creating an opportunity and duty to speak.” In re Marriage of Richardson, 237 Ill.App.3d 1067, 606 N.E.2d 56, 67; 179 Ill.Dec. 224, 235 (1st Dist.1992). Concealment of an existing material fact is actionable where employed as a device to mislead. Chapman v. Hosek, 131 Ill.App.3d 180, 475 N.E.2d 593, 598; 86 Ill.Dec. 379, 384 (1st Dist.1985). Fraud is the intentional misrepresentation of a material fact or the concealment of a fact which induces a party to rely on that misrepresentation to his or her detriment. In re Marriage of Gurin, 212 Ill.App.3d 806, 571 N.E.2d 857, 862; 156 Ill.Dec. 877, 882 (1st Dist.1991). Silence alone does not generally constitute a misrepresentation. Russow v. Bobola, 2 Ill.App.3d 837, 277 N.E.2d 769 (2d Dist.1972). However, when the opportunity and duty to speak exists, deceptive conduct or the suppression of material facts is involved, and the injured party would have acted differently absent the other party's silence, such silence may constitute either misrepresentation or concealment. Heider v. Leewards Creative Crafts, Inc., 245 Ill.App.3d 258, 613 N.E.2d 805, 184 Ill.Dec. 488 (2d Dist.1993); In re Marriage of Richardson, 237 Ill.App.3d 1067, 606 N.E.2d 56, 179 Ill.Dec. 224 (1st Dist.1992). In cases involving such fraudulent behavior, the distinction between concealment and affirmative misrepresentation is tenuous. Lindsey v. Edgar, 129 Ill.App.3d 718, 473 N.E.2d 92, 84 Ill.Dec. 876 (4th Dist.1984). 

These facts will be shown in the fraudulent concealment of important information in correspondence sent to the plaintiffs and others regarding this occurrence. There are too many instances to list. 

Illinois courts have consistently held that the elements of a claim for fraudulent concealment are the same as the elements for a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. Intentional concealment is said to be the equivalent of a false statement of material fact. Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 156 Ill.App.3d 154, 510 N.E.2d 409, 413; 109 Ill.Dec. 541, 545 (1st Dist.1986). 

Count XXV  and XXVII – Fraudulent Misrepresentations and Fraudulent Concealment (Parent 1) 

The company paid by Parent 2 and Parent 1 and those acting on their behalf or employed inside their corporation and subsidiaries have made numerous misrepresentations regarding material facts to the plaintiffs. There are too many instances to list.  

“Fraud may consist in the concealment of what is true as well as the assertion of what is false where the concealment is shown to have been done with the intention to deceive under circumstances creating an opportunity and duty to speak.” In re Marriage of Richardson, 237 Ill.App.3d 1067, 606 N.E.2d 56, 67; 179 Ill.Dec. 224, 235 (1st Dist.1992). Concealment of an existing material fact is actionable where employed as a device to mislead. Chapman v. Hosek, 131 Ill.App.3d 180, 475 N.E.2d 593, 598; 86 Ill.Dec. 379, 384 (1st Dist.1985). Fraud is the intentional misrepresentation of a material fact or the concealment of a fact which induces a party to rely on that misrepresentation to his or her detriment. In re Marriage of Gurin, 212 Ill.App.3d 806, 571 N.E.2d 857, 862; 156 Ill.Dec. 877, 882 (1st Dist.1991). Silence alone does not generally constitute a misrepresentation. Russow v. Bobola, 2 Ill.App.3d 837, 277 N.E.2d 769 (2d Dist.1972). However, when the opportunity and duty to speak exists, deceptive conduct or the suppression of material facts is involved, and the injured party would have acted differently absent the other party's silence, such silence may constitute either misrepresentation or concealment. Heider v. Leewards Creative Crafts, Inc., 245 Ill.App.3d 258, 613 N.E.2d 805, 184 Ill.Dec. 488 (2d Dist.1993); In re Marriage of Richardson, 237 Ill.App.3d 1067, 606 N.E.2d 56, 179 Ill.Dec. 224 (1st Dist.1992). In cases involving such fraudulent behavior, the distinction between concealment and affirmative misrepresentation is tenuous. Lindsey v. Edgar, 129 Ill.App.3d 718, 473 N.E.2d 92, 84 Ill.Dec. 876 (4th Dist.1984). 

These facts will be shown in the fraudulent concealment of important information in correspondence sent to the plaintiffs and others regarding this occurrence. There are too many instances to list. 

Illinois courts have consistently held that the elements of a claim for fraudulent concealment are the same as the elements for a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. Intentional concealment is said to be the equivalent of a false statement of material fact. Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 156 Ill.App.3d 154, 510 N.E.2d 409, 413; 109 Ill.Dec. 541, 545 (1st Dist.1986). 

Count XXVIII– Fraud and Deceit (Parent 2) 

The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 and those acting on their behalf or employed inside their corporation and subsidiaries have used fraud and deceit to harass and intimidate the plaintiffs.  

“Fraud may consist in the concealment of what is true as well as the assertion of what is false where the concealment is shown to have been done with the intention to deceive under circumstances creating an opportunity and duty to speak.” In re Marriage of Richardson, 237 Ill.App.3d 1067, 606 N.E.2d 56, 67; 179 Ill.Dec. 224, 235 (1st Dist.1992). Concealment of an existing material fact is actionable where employed as a device to mislead. Chapman v. Hosek, 131 Ill.App.3d 180, 475 N.E.2d 593, 598; 86 Ill.Dec. 379, 384 (1st Dist.1985). Fraud is the intentional misrepresentation of a material fact or the concealment of a fact which induces a party to rely on that misrepresentation to his or her detriment. In re Marriage of Gurin, 212 Ill.App.3d 806, 571 N.E.2d 857, 862; 156 Ill.Dec. 877, 882 (1st Dist.1991). Silence alone does not generally constitute a misrepresentation. Russow v. Bobola, 2 Ill.App.3d 837, 277 N.E.2d 769 (2d Dist.1972). However, when the opportunity and duty to speak exists, deceptive conduct or the suppression of material facts is involved, and the injured party would have acted differently absent the other party's silence, such silence may constitute either misrepresentation or concealment. Heider v. Leewards Creative Crafts, Inc., 245 Ill.App.3d 258, 613 N.E.2d 805, 184 Ill.Dec. 488 (2d Dist.1993); In re Marriage of Richardson, 237 Ill.App.3d 1067, 606 N.E.2d 56, 179 Ill.Dec. 224 (1st Dist.1992). In cases involving such fraudulent behavior, the distinction between concealment and affirmative misrepresentation is tenuous. Lindsey v. Edgar, 129 Ill.App.3d 718, 473 N.E.2d 92, 84 Ill.Dec. 876 (4th Dist.1984). 

This fraudulent activity was an attempt to cover up the theft and the failure of their fiduciary duty to Minor. This included manufacturing evidence to delay these proceedings. 

Illinois courts have consistently held that the elements of a claim for fraudulent concealment are the same as the elements for a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. Intentional concealment is said to be the equivalent of a false statement of material fact. Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 156 Ill.App.3d 154, 510 N.E.2d 409, 413; 109 Ill.Dec. 541, 545 (1st Dist.1986). 

Count XXVIII– Fraud and Deceit (Parent 1) 

The company paid by Parent 1 and Parent 2 and those acting on their behalf or employed inside their corporation and subsidiaries have used fraud and deceit to harass and intimidate the plaintiffs.  

“Fraud may consist in the concealment of what is true as well as the assertion of what is false where the concealment is shown to have been done with the intention to deceive under circumstances creating an opportunity and duty to speak.” In re Marriage of Richardson, 237 Ill.App.3d 1067, 606 N.E.2d 56, 67; 179 Ill.Dec. 224, 235 (1st Dist.1992). Concealment of an existing material fact is actionable where employed as a device to mislead. Chapman v. Hosek, 131 Ill.App.3d 180, 475 N.E.2d 593, 598; 86 Ill.Dec. 379, 384 (1st Dist.1985). Fraud is the intentional misrepresentation of a material fact or the concealment of a fact which induces a party to rely on that misrepresentation to his or her detriment. In re Marriage of Gurin, 212 Ill.App.3d 806, 571 N.E.2d 857, 862; 156 Ill.Dec. 877, 882 (1st Dist.1991). Silence alone does not generally constitute a misrepresentation. Russow v. Bobola, 2 Ill.App.3d 837, 277 N.E.2d 769 (2d Dist.1972). However, when the opportunity and duty to speak exists, deceptive conduct or the suppression of material facts is involved, and the injured party would have acted differently absent the other party's silence, such silence may constitute either misrepresentation or concealment. Heider v. Leewards Creative Crafts, Inc., 245 Ill.App.3d 258, 613 N.E.2d 805, 184 Ill.Dec. 488 (2d Dist.1993); In re Marriage of Richardson, 237 Ill.App.3d 1067, 606 N.E.2d 56, 179 Ill.Dec. 224 (1st Dist.1992). In cases involving such fraudulent behavior, the distinction between concealment and affirmative misrepresentation is tenuous. Lindsey v. Edgar, 129 Ill.App.3d 718, 473 N.E.2d 92, 84 Ill.Dec. 876 (4th Dist.1984). 

This fraudulent activity was an attempt to cover up the theft and the failure of their fiduciary duty to Minor. This included manufacturing evidence to delay these proceedings. 

Illinois courts have consistently held that the elements of a claim for fraudulent concealment are the same as the elements for a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. Intentional concealment is said to be the equivalent of a false statement of material fact. Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 156 Ill.App.3d 154, 510 N.E.2d 409, 413; 109 Ill.Dec. 541, 545 (1st Dist.1986). 

Damages to Plaintiff 2 (Lines 346-357) 

Plaintiff 2 received numerous physical injuries including but not limited to whiplash, concussion, migraines, light sensitivity and numerous lacerations and contusions as result of the occurrence.  

Plaintiff 2 required numerous physical therapy appointments to acquire full use of her arms and neck. 

Plaintiff 2 suffered psychiatric issues because of this accident. Plaintiff 2 suffered huge amounts of stress and other psychiatric issues because of the accident, constant harassment, and intimidation that prevented her from returning to her normal duties. 

Plaintiff 2 was medically restricted from normal duties at her places of employment for months. 

Plaintiff 2 has suffered severe personal economic losses resulting from this occurrence. 

As a result of those acting on the defendants’ behalf, these interruptions to Plaintiff 2’s work have lasted for over a year and have been on going as of February 21, 2024.     

Plaintiff 2’s intimate relationship with Plaintiff 1 has suffered because of the acts in this occurrence. 

Plaintiff 2 owns a business with Plaintiff 1, and they repair and maintain properties.  

Plaintiff 1 was unable to perform tasks that were essential to completing his work for the partnership with Plaintiff 2 from August 19, 2022, through August 22, 2022, due to his injuries.   

Plaintiff 1 had limited availability for work due to running Plaintiff 2 and Victim 1 to doctor’s appointments, work, groceries, pharmacies, etc. for approximately a month until Plaintiff 2 could start driving again.   

As a result of those acting on the defendants’ behalf, these interruptions to Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2’s work have lasted for over a year and have been on going as of February 21, 2024.   

This Delay in Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 1’s work had a direct impact on later projects and compounded huge losses and compounded lost future revenues.   

Damages to Plaintiff 1 (Lines 358-369) 

Plaintiff 1 received abrasions, contusions, and minor lacerations from the impact in the above stated accident which are documented and commented on by law enforcement in bodycam footage directly after the accident.  

Plaintiff 1 chipped his two front incisors and received treatment which required getting two crowns from the above stated impact.  

Plaintiff 1 made an appointment on August 22, 2022, with his dentist. He was seen and treated on September 7, 2022, by his dentist.   

Plaintiff 1 was injured in the above-mentioned accident and has had economic losses as a direct result of those injuries.   

Plaintiff 1 suffered huge amounts of stress because of the accident, constant harassment, and intimidation that prevented him from returning to his normal duties. 

Plaintiff 1’s intimate relationship with Plaintiff 2 has suffered because of the acts in this occurrence. 

Plaintiff 1 had limited availability for work due to running Plaintiff 2 and Victim 1 to doctor’s appointments, work, groceries, pharmacies, etc. for approximately a month until Sarah could start driving again.  

As a result of those acting on the defendants’ behalf, these interruptions to Plaintiff 1’s work have lasted for over a year and have been on going as of February 21, 2024.  

Plaintiff 1 suffered huge amounts of stress because of the accident, constant harassment, and intimidation that prevented him from returning to his normal duties. 

The claim by Plaintiff 1 for his business Business 1 in this occurrence is regarding a (REDACTED) This project was halted due to constant interference, harassment, and intimidation. 

The lost revenues caused by this are incalculable. 

A demonstration will be performed in front of the jury. After the demonstration, the jury will be given questions, and their answers will give the stats and reference numbers to apply to a few markets. Those averages can be used to calculate the total loss of revenues for the period of time in question. 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs seeks judgement against the Defendants as follows:      

That Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 be awarded actual compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial.   

That Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 be awarded general compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial.   

That Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 be awarded all costs incurred by Plaintiff in connection with this action, and   

That Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 be awarded any such other and all relief to which Plaintiff may be entitled as a matter of law and deemed appropriate by the court. 

Under Penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument true and correct, except to matters therein stated to be on the information and belief and as such matter the undersigned certifies that he verily believes the same to be true.