Generally, a next friend appears in court on behalf of detained prisoners who are unable, usually because of mental incompetence or inaccessibility, to seek relief themselves. (Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990)) .

In Whitmore, the Court laid out the prerequisites for “next friend” standing.

First, a “next friend” must provide an adequate explanation—such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf in the action.

Second, the “next friend” must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate and it has been further suggested that a “next friend” must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest.

The burden is on the “next friend” clearly to establish the propriety of his status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court. 

In Illinois, every minor (“A minor is a person who has not attained the age of 18 years.” 755 ILCS 5/11-1”) involved in litigation is a ward of the court. (Ott by Ott v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 273 Ill.App.3d 563, 570–71 (1st Dist. 1995) As a matter of public policy, the rights of minors are generally guarded carefully, and courts have both a duty to protect the rights of minors, and broad discretion in exercising this role. (Id) Accordingly, there are specific rules that apply to the handling of a minor’s case.

Generally, the right to sue on behalf of a minor would fall with a parent (as next friend) or guardian of the minor. The natural mother or father of a minor may appear as next friend without court appointment. (Stevenson v. Hawthorne Elem. School,144 Ill.2d.at 300) Even where sole custody of the minor has been awarded to one parent, both parents retain the right to sue on behalf of the minor. (Id., at 301) However, the best interests of the minor are paramount, and where one parent has a conflict of interest, a court will not allow that parent to litigate for the minor as “next friend." (Id., at 301-302)

Technically, a court may allow any person to litigate on behalf of a minor as next friend. (755 ILCS 5/11a-18(c)) However, if the representation of the parent as next friend is adequate, then there is generally no need for a court to appoint a guardian. (Stevenson v. Hawthorne Elem. School,144 Ill.2d..at 304) For representation to be “adequate,” there must be no conflict of interest between either the minor and next friend, or between multiple minors. (Sunderland v. Portes, 324 Ill.App.3d 105, 112 (2d Dist. 2001)) Furthermore, for representation to be adequate, the next friend must take the necessary steps to prosecute the minor’s case. (Sunderland, 324 Ill.App.3d at 112)

The court may also appoint a GAL on its own motion, and it has broad discretion to do so when it finds it to be in the best interests of the minor, (Id) or whenever the court is concerned that the minor’s interests are not adequately represented. (Id.; (Stevenson v. Hawthorne Elem. School,144 Ill.2d..at 302) Thus, a court will appoint a GAL when the interests of the minor and next friend are different, (Skaggs v. Industrial Com, 371 Ill. at 541–42) adverse, (Kroot v. Liberty Bank of Chicago,307 Ill.App.209, 214 (1st Dist. 1940)) or conflicting. (Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Strickland, 33 Ill.App.3d 52, 58 (1st Dist. 1975); In re Estate of Viehman, 47 Ill.App.2d 138, 149 (5th Dist. 1964)) Additionally, a court will appoint a GAL to review and complete a settlement offer that is in the best interests of the minor, if the next friend rejects such an offer or refuses to follow through on it. (Will v. Northwestern Univ., 378 Ill.App.3d 280, 294 (1st Dist. 2007); Ott by Ott v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 273 Ill.App.3d 563, 571 (1st Dist. 1995)) In practice, many circuit courts will appoint a GAL to review a petition to settle a minor’s cause of action, although the decision to do so is discretionary.

While a next friend can hire an attorney and file suit on behalf of a minor, they have no legal right to settle a minor’s cause of action without court approval. (Mastroianni v. Curtis, 78 Ill.App.3d 97, 100 (1st Dist. 1979)) Any proposed settlement agreement must be reviewed and approved by the court. (755 ILCS 5/19-8; Ott by Ott v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 273 Ill.App.3d 563, 571 (1st Dist. 1995)) Therefore, if a settlement is reached before a case is fi led, a probate case generally needs to be opened so the court can review and approve the settlement. (Mastroianni v. Curtis, 78 Ill.App.3d 97, 101 (1st Dist. 1979))

As with all other determinations affecting a minor, the court will only approve a settlement that is in the best interests of the minor. (Ott, 273 Ill.App.3d at 573) The consequence of failing to seek or obtain court approval is that the settlement may be deemed unenforceable. (Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc., 316 Ill. App.3d 1023, 1028 (1st Dist. 2000)) 

Next friend means a person designated in accordance with 12VAC35-115-146 B to serve as the authorized representative of an individual who has been determined to lack capacity to consent or authorize the disclosure of identifying information, when required under this chapter.  Rumsfeld v Padilla Docket Nos. 03-2235(L), 03-2438(CON.)

Next friend standing is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000), which declares that a habeas petition may be brought “by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.” Id. (emphasis added).   In Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990), the Supreme Court noted that next friend standing “has long been an accepted basis for jurisdiction in certain circumstances,” and has most often been invoked “on behalf of detained prisoners who are unable, usually because of mental incompetence or inaccessibility, to seek relief themselves.”  Id. at 162, 110 S.Ct. 1717.  “A ‘next friend’ does not himself become a party to the habeas corpus action in which he participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest.”   Id. at 163, 110 S.Ct. 1717.   A next friend “resembles an attorney, or a guardian ad litem, by whom a suit is brought or defended in behalf of another.”  Morgan v. Potter, 157 U.S. 195, 198, 15 S.Ct. 590, 39 L.Ed. 670 (1895).   The availability of next friend status is, however, subject to significant limitations:

Decisions applying the habeas corpus statute have adhered to at least two firmly rooted prerequisites for “next friend” standing.   First, a “next friend” must provide an adequate explanation-such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability-why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action.   Second, the “next friend” must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate, and it has been further suggested that a “next friend” must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest.   The burden is on the “next friend” clearly to establish the propriety of his status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court.

Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163-64, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (internal citations omitted).   These “limitations on the ‘next friend’ doctrine are driven by the recognition that ‘[i]t was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be availed of, as matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves next friends.’ ”  Id. at 164, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (quoting United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir.1921)).7 

(735 ILCS 5/Art. II Pt. 5 heading) Part 5. Appointment of Guardians

(735 ILCS 5/2-502) (from Ch. 110, par. 2-502) 
   Sec. 2-502. Guardians for minors. Guardianships for minors shall be governed by Section 11-13 of the "Probate Act of 1975", as amended. 
(Source: P.A. 82-280.)

(755 ILCS 5/11-13) (from Ch. 110 1/2, par. 11-13) 
   Sec. 11-13. Duties of guardian of a minor. Before a guardian of a minor may act, the guardian shall be appointed by the court of the proper county

(755 ILCS 5/11-13.1) 
   Sec. 11-13.1. Duties of standby guardian of a minor. 
   (a) Before a standby guardian of a minor may act, the standby guardian must be appointed by the court of the proper county

(755 ILCS 5/11-1) (from Ch. 110 1/2, par. 11-1)

Sec. 11-1. Minor defined.) A minor is a person who has not attained the age of 18 years. A person who has attained the age of 18 years is of legal age for all purposes except as otherwise provided in the Illinois Uniform Transfers to Minors Act.

(755 ILCS 5/11-5) (from Ch. 110 1/2, par. 11-5)

Sec. 11-5. Appointment of guardian.

(a) Upon the filing of a petition for the appointment of a guardian or on its own motion, the court may appoint a guardian of the estate or of both the person and estate, of a minor, or may appoint a guardian of the person only of a minor or minors, as the court finds to be in the best interest of the minor or minors.

(a-1) A parent, adoptive parent or adjudicated parent, whose parental rights have not been terminated, may designate in any writing, including a will, a person qualified to act under Section 11-3 to be appointed as guardian of the person or estate, or both, of an unmarried minor or of a child likely to be born. A parent, adoptive parent or adjudicated parent, whose parental rights have not been terminated, or a guardian or a standby guardian of an unmarried minor or of a child likely to be born may designate in any writing, including a will, a person qualified to act under Section 11-3 to be appointed as successor guardian of the minor's person or estate, or both. The designation must be witnessed by 2 or more credible witnesses at least 18 years of age, neither of whom is the person designated as the guardian. The designation may be proved by any competent evidence. If the designation is executed and attested in the same manner as a will, it shall have prima facie validity. The designation of a guardian or successor guardian does not affect the rights of the other parent in the minor.

(b) The court lacks jurisdiction to proceed on a petition for the appointment of a guardian of a minor if it finds that (i) the minor has a living parent, adoptive parent or adjudicated parent, whose parental rights have not been terminated, whose whereabouts are known, and who is willing and able to make and carry out day-to-day child care decisions concerning the minor, unless: (1) the parent or parents voluntarily relinquished physical custody of the minor; (2) after receiving notice of the hearing under Section 11-10.1, the parent or parents fail to object to the appointment at the hearing on the petition; or (3) the parent or parents consent to the appointment as evidenced by a written document that has been notarized and dated, or by a personal appearance and consent in open court; or (ii) there is a guardian for the minor appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a parent of a minor is willing and able to make and carry out day-to-day child care decisions concerning the minor, but the presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. If a short-term guardian has been appointed for the minor prior to the filing of the petition and the petitioner for guardianship is not the short-term guardian, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is in the best interest of the minor to remain in the care of the short-term guardian. The petitioner shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it is not in the child's best interest to remain with the short-term guardian.

(b-1) If the court finds the appointment of a guardian of the minor to be in the best interest of the minor, and if a standby guardian has previously been appointed for the minor under Section 11-5.3, the court shall appoint the standby guardian as the guardian of the person or estate, or both, of the minor unless the court finds, upon good cause shown, that the appointment would no longer be in the best interest of the minor.

(c) If the minor is 14 years of age or more, the minor may nominate the guardian of the minor's person and estate, subject to approval of the court. If the minor's nominee is not approved by the court or if, after notice to the minor, the minor fails to nominate a guardian of the minor's person or estate, the court may appoint the guardian without nomination.

(d) The court shall not appoint as guardian of the person of the minor any person whom the court has determined had caused or substantially contributed to the minor becoming a neglected or abused minor as defined in the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, unless 2 years have elapsed since the last proven incident of abuse or neglect and the court determines that appointment of such person as guardian is in the best interests of the minor.

(e) Previous statements made by the minor relating to any allegations that the minor is an abused or neglected child within the meaning of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act, or an abused or neglected minor within the meaning of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, shall be admissible in evidence in a hearing concerning appointment of a guardian of the person or estate of the minor. No such statement, however, if uncorroborated and not subject to cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect.

(Source: P.A. 98-1082, eff. 1-1-15.)

(755 ILCS 5/11-18) (from Ch. 110 1/2, par. 11-18) 
   Sec. 11-18. Successor guardian. Upon the death, incapacity, resignation or removal of a standby guardian or a guardian, the court may appoint a successor standby guardian or a successor guardian. 
(Source: P.A. 88-529.)

(705 ILCS 405/Art. II heading) ARTICLE II. ABUSED, NEGLECTED OR DEPENDENT MINORS

(705 ILCS 405/2-1) (from Ch. 37, par. 802-1) 
Sec. 2-1. Jurisdictional facts. Proceedings may be instituted under the provisions of this Article concerning boys and girls who are abused, neglected or dependent, as defined in Sections 2-3 or 2-4. 
(Source: P.A. 85-601.)

(705 ILCS 405/2-3) (from Ch. 37, par. 802-3) 
Sec. 2-3. Neglected or abused minor. 
(1) Those who are neglected include: 
(a) any minor under 18 years of age who is not receiving the proper or necessary support, education as required by law, or medical or other remedial care recognized under State law as necessary for a minor's well-being, or other care necessary for his or her well-being 

Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 927, 939-41 (6th Cir.) (holding invalid father's consent to single attorney's representation of two plaintiff-daughters where attorney failed to disclose possibility that one daughter would have claim against the other), 449 U.S. 888 (1980). 

When a liability insurance company employs policy terms that obtain the irrevocable power to determine whether an offer to compromise a personal-injury claim will be accepted or rejected, it creates a fiduciary relationship between it and the insured with resulting duties that grow out of that relationship.  Cernocky v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America, 69 Ill.App.2d at 207-08, 216 N.E.2d at 204 (relying on Ballardv. Citizens Cas. Co. of New York, 196 F.2d at 102);  see also Douglas v. Allied American Insurance, 312 Ill.App.3d 535, 543, 245 Ill.Dec. 123, 727 N.E.2d 376, 382 (2000) (“An insurance company has a fiduciary duty to defend its insured and to consider the insured's interest.”).

Courts must offer vigilant protection to those who find themselves in a position of vulnerability in a fiduciary relationship.   See Central Bank-Granite City, 188 Ill.App.3d 936, 136 Ill.Dec. 346, 544 N.E.2d 1121 (elderly);  National Bank of Monticello v. Doss, 141 Ill.App.3d 1065, 96 Ill.Dec. 292, 491 N.E.2d 106 (1986) (mentally limited).

(720 ILCS 5/17-56) (was 720 ILCS 5/16-1.3)

   Sec. 17-56. Financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability.

   (a) A person commits financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability when he or she stands in a position of trust or confidence with the elderly person or a person with a disability and he or she knowingly:

       (1) by deception or intimidation obtains control over the property of an elderly person or a person with a disability; or

       (2) illegally uses the assets or resources of an elderly person or a person with a disability.

   (b) Sentence. Financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability is: (1) a Class 4 felony if the value of the property is $300 or less, (2) a Class 3 felony if the value of the property is more than $300 but less than $5,000, (3) a Class 2 felony if the value of the property is $5,000 or more but less than $50,000, and (4) a Class 1 felony if the value of the property is $50,000 or more or if the elderly person is over 70 years of age and the value of the property is $15,000 or more or if the elderly person is 80 years of age or older and the value of the property is $5,000 or more.

   (c) For purposes of this Section:

       (1) "Elderly person" means a person 60 years of age or older.

       (2) "Person with a disability" means a person who suffers from a physical or mental impairment resulting from disease, injury, functional disorder or congenital condition that impairs the individual's mental or physical ability to independently manage his or her property or financial resources, or both.

       (3) "Intimidation" means the communication to an elderly person or a person with a disability that he or she shall be deprived of food and nutrition, shelter, prescribed medication or medical care and treatment or conduct as provided in Section 12-6 of this Code.

       (4) "Deception" means, in addition to its meaning as defined in Section 15-4 of this Code, a misrepresentation or concealment of material fact relating to the terms of a contract or agreement entered into with the elderly person or person with a disability or to the existing or pre-existing condition of any of the property involved in such contract or agreement; or the use or employment of any misrepresentation, false pretense or false promise in order to induce, encourage or solicit the elderly person or person with a disability to enter into a contract or agreement.

   The illegal use of the assets or resources of an elderly person or a person with a disability includes, but is not limited to, the misappropriation of those assets or resources by undue influence, breach of a fiduciary relationship, fraud, deception, extortion, or use of the assets or resources contrary to law.

   A person stands in a position of trust and confidence with an elderly person or person with a disability when he (i) is a parent, spouse, adult child or other relative by blood or marriage of the elderly person or person with a disability, (ii) is a joint tenant or tenant in common with the elderly person or person with a disability, (iii) has a legal or fiduciary relationship with the elderly person or person with a disability, (iv) is a financial planning or investment professional, (v) is a paid or unpaid caregiver for the elderly person or person with a disability, or (vi) is a friend or acquaintance in a position of trust.

   (d) Limitations. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit the remedies available to the victim under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.

   (e) Good faith efforts. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to impose criminal liability on a person who has made a good faith effort to assist the elderly person or person with a disability in the management of his or her property, but through no fault of his or her own has been unable to provide such assistance.

   (f) Not a defense. It shall not be a defense to financial exploitation of an elderly person or person with a disability that the accused reasonably believed that the victim was not an elderly person or person with a disability. Consent is not a defense to financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability if the accused knew or had reason to know that the elderly person or a person with a disability lacked capacity to consent.

   (g) Civil Liability. A civil cause of action exists for financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability as described in subsection (a) of this Section. A person against whom a civil judgment has been entered for financial exploitation of an elderly person or person with a disability shall be liable to the victim or to the estate of the victim in damages of treble the amount of the value of the property obtained, plus reasonable attorney fees and court costs. In a civil action under this subsection, the burden of proof that the defendant committed financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability as described in subsection (a) of this Section shall be by a preponderance of the evidence. This subsection shall be operative whether or not the defendant has been charged or convicted of the criminal offense as described in subsection (a) of this Section. This subsection (g) shall not limit or affect the right of any person to bring any cause of action or seek any remedy available under the common law, or other applicable law, arising out of the financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability.

   (h) If a person is charged with financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability that involves the taking or loss of property valued at more than $5,000, a prosecuting attorney may file a petition with the circuit court of the county in which the defendant has been charged to freeze the assets of the defendant in an amount equal to but not greater than the alleged value of lost or stolen property in the defendant's pending criminal proceeding for purposes of restitution to the victim. The burden of proof required to freeze the defendant's assets shall be by a preponderance of the evidence.

(Source: P.A. 101-394, eff. 1-1-20; 102-244, eff. 1-1-22.) 

(735 ILCS 5/8-802) (from Ch. 110, par. 8-802) 
   Sec. 8-802. Physician and patient. No physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any information he or she may have acquired in attending any patient in a professional character, necessary to enable him or her professionally to serve the patient, except only  (4) in all actions brought by or against the patient, his or her personal representative, a beneficiary under a policy of insurance, or the executor or administrator of his or her estate wherein the patient's physical or mental condition is an issue, 

Subject to certain exceptions, the Privacy Rule at 45 CFR 164.502(g) requires covered entities to treat an individual’s personal representative as the individual with respect to uses and disclosures of the individual’s protected health information, as well as the individual’s rights under the Rule.

The personal representative stands in the shoes of the individual and has the ability to act for the individual and exercise the individual’s rights. For instance, covered entities must provide the individual’s personal representative with an accounting of disclosures in accordance with 45 CFR 164.528, as well as provide the personal representative access to the individual’s protected health information in accordance with 45 CFR 164.524 to the extent such information is relevant to such representation. In addition to exercising the individual’s rights under the Rule, a personal representative may also authorize disclosures of the individual’s protected health information.

In general, the scope of the personal representative’s authority to act for the individual under the Privacy Rule derives from his or her authority under applicable law to make health care decisions for the individual. Where the person has broad authority to act on the behalf of a living individual in making decisions related to health care, such as is usually the case with a parent with respect to a minor child or a legal guardian of a mentally incompetent adult, the covered entity must treat the personal representative as the individual for all purposes under the Rule, unless an exception applies. (See below with respect to abuse, neglect or endangerment situations, and the application of State law in the context of parents and minors). Where the authority to act for the individual is limited or specific to particular health care decisions, the personal representative is to be treated as the individual only with respect to protected health information that is relevant to the representation. For example, a person with an individual’s limited health care power of attorney regarding only a specific treatment, such as use of artificial life support, is that individual’s personal representative only with respect to protected health information that relates to that health care decision. The covered entity should not treat that person as the individual for other purposes, such as to sign an authorization for the disclosure of protected health information for marketing purposes. Finally, where the person has authority to act on the behalf of a deceased individual or his estate, which does not have to include the authority to make decisions related to health care, the covered entity must treat the personal representative as the individual with respect to protected health information relevant to such personal representation (e.g., an executor of an estate has the right to access all of the protected health information of the decedent relevant to these responsibilities).1   State or other law should be consulted to determine the authority of the personal representative to receive or access the individual’s protected health information. 

Moreover, contract doctrine aside, courts have increasingly recognized a minor's right to engage counsel of the minor's own choice, at least where the minor is capable of choosing and has selected competent counsel. See, e.g., In re A.W., 618 N.E.2d 729,733-34 (IlM. App. Ct.) (granting 13-year-old's motion to substitute for appointed guardian an attorney of her own choice in dispute following adjudication of wardship; minor was sufficiently mature and competent in making decision), cert denied, 624 N.E.2d 811 (1993); Fargnoli v. Faber, 481 N.Y.S.2d 784, 786 (App. Div. 1984) (affirming family court ruling that children have the right to select impartial representation free from parental intervention) 

RULE 1.14: CLIENT WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY (a) When a client’s capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client. (b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client’s own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian. (c) Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests. 

The natural mother or father of a minor may appear as next friend without court appointment. (Stevenson v. Hawthorne Elem. School , 144 Ill.2d.at 300)

However, the best interests of the minor are paramount, and where one parent has a conflict of interest, a court will not allow that parent to litigate for the minor as “next friend." (Id., at 301-302)    

Moreover, contract doctrine aside, courts have increasingly recognized a minor's right to engage counsel of the minor's own choice, at least where the minor is capable of choosing and has selected competent counsel. See, e.g., In re A.W., 618 N.E.2d 729,733-34 (IlM. App. Ct.)    

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990)), the Court laid out the prerequisites for “next friend” standing. First, a “next friend” must provide an adequate explanation—such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf in the action. Second, the “next friend” must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate and it has been further suggested that a “next friend” must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest.  The burden is on the “next friend” clearly to establish the propriety of his status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court.  

“For representation to be “adequate,” there must be no conflict of interest between either the minor and next friend, or between multiple minors.” (Sunderland v. Portes, 324 Ill.App.3d 105, 112 (2d Dist. 2001))

Furthermore, for representation to be adequate, the next friend must take the necessary steps to prosecute the minor’s case (Sunderland v. Portes, 324 Ill.App.3d 105, 112 (2d Dist. 2001))      

A next friend “resembles an attorney, or a guardian ad litem, by whom a suit is brought or defended in behalf of another.”  Morgan v. Potter, 157 U.S. 195, 198, 15 S.Ct. 590, 39 L.Ed. 670 (1895).

In Illinois, every minor (“A minor is a person who has not attained the age of 18 years.” 755 ILCS 5/11-1”) involved in litigation is a ward of the court. (Ott by Ott v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 273 Ill.App.3d 563, 570–71 (1st Dist. 1995)

As a matter of public policy, the rights of minors are generally guarded carefully, and courts have both a duty to protect the rights of minors, and broad discretion in exercising this role. (Id) The court may also appoint a GAL on its own motion, and it has broad discretion to do so when it finds it to be in the best interests of the minor, (Id) or whenever the court is concerned that the minor’s interests are not adequately represented. (Id.; Stevenson, 144 Ill. 2d at 302)

Thus, a court will appoint a GAL when the interests of the minor and next friend are different, (Skaggs v. Industrial Com, 21 N.E.2d 731 (Ill. 1939)) adverse, (Kroot v. Liberty Bank of Chicago,307 Ill.App.209, 214 (1st Dist. 1940)) or conflicting. (Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Strickland, 33 Ill.App.3d 52, 58 (1st Dist. 1975); In re Estate of Viehman, 47 Ill.App.2d 138, 149 (5th Dist. 1964))

“A ‘next friend’ does not himself become a party to the habeas corpus action in which he participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest.”  Id. at 163, 110 S.Ct. 1717

A next friend “resembles an attorney, or a guardian ad litem, by whom a suit is brought or defended in behalf of another.”  Morgan v. Potter, 157 U.S. 195, 198, 15 S.Ct. 590, 39 L.Ed. 670 (1895).

The availability of next friend status is, however, subject to significant limitations:   First, a “next friend” must provide an adequate explanation-such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability-why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action.   Second, the “next friend” must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate, and it has been further suggested that a “next friend” must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest.    The burden is on the “next friend” clearly to establish the propriety of his status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court. Whitmore Ex Rel. Simmons v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 109 L. Ed. 2d 135, 58 U.S.L.W. 3677, (1990)

These “limitations on the ‘next friend’ doctrine are driven by the recognition that ‘[i]t was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be availed of, as matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves next friends.’ ”  Id. at 164, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (quoting United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir.1921)).    

“This holding is based on the well-settled rule of law that a minor cannot bring a legal proceeding nor engage in one in person or by an attorney but must appear by a guardian, a guardian ad litem or a next friend. (Waechter v. Industrial Com., 11 N.E.2d 378 (Ill. 1937) supra; Walgreen Co. v. Industrial Com. 323 Ill. 194 (Ill. 1926).

Where a minor’s parents fail to appear for a motion for summary judgment, a court may find that the representation is not adequate. Id., at 108, 111–12.

“A ‘next friend’ does not himself become a party to the habeas corpus action in which he participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest.” Id. at 163, 110 S.Ct. 1717

A next friend “resembles an attorney, or a guardian ad litem, by whom a suit is brought or defended in behalf of another.”  Morgan v. Potter, 157 U.S. 195, 198, 15 S.Ct. 590, 39 L.Ed. 670 (1895).

‘[i]t was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be availed of, as matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves next friends.’” Id. at 164, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (quoting United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir.1921)) 

When a liability insurance company employs policy terms that obtain the irrevocable power to determine whether an offer to compromise a personal-injury claim will be accepted or rejected, it creates a fiduciary relationship between it and the insured with resulting duties that grow out of that relationship.  Cernocky v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America, 69 Ill.App.2d at 207-08, 216 N.E.2d at 204 (1996)(relying on Ballard v. Citizens Cas. Co. of New York, 196 F.2d at 102 (7th Cir. 1952));  see also Douglas v. Allied American Insurance, 312 Ill.App.3d 535, 543, 245 Ill.Dec. 123, 727 N.E.2d 376, 382 (2000)

(“An insurance company has a fiduciary duty to defend its insured and to consider the insured's interest.”).   Courts must offer vigilant protection to those who find themselves in a position of vulnerability in a fiduciary relationship.   See Central Bank — Granite City v. Ziaee, 188 Ill.App.3d 936, 136 Ill.Dec. 346, 544 N.E.2d 1121 (1989) (elderly);  National Bank of Monticello v. Doss, 141 Ill.App.3d 1065, 96 Ill.Dec. 292, 491 N.E.2d 106 (1986) (mentally limited)

Kevin So v. Suchanek, 670 F.3d 1304, 1310–11 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (rejecting as irrelevant the lawyer’s subjective belief that no conflict existed in a joint representation; rather, the analysis depended on whether an objective observer with the lawyer’s knowledge of the circumstances would have reasonably doubted his ability to undertake the joint representation);

Robertson v. Wittenmyer, 736 N.E.2d 804, 807–08 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that the lawyer could not have reasonably believed that the representation of one client against another was permissible).  In the insurance defense context, a defense lawyer’s conflict of interest arising out of the representation of multiple insureds may entitle the insureds to independent counsel at the insurer’s expense.  

Univ. of Miami v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 112 So. 3d 504, 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (“[I]n defense of both co-defendants, Great American’s counsel would have had to argue conflicting legal positions, that each of its clients was not at fault, and the other was, even to the extent of claiming indemnification and contribution for the other’s fault. . . . [T]his legal dilemma clearly created a conflict of interest . . . sufficient to qualify for indemnification for attorney’s fees and costs for independent counsel.”)    

This holding is based on the well-settled rule of law that a minor cannot bring a legal proceeding nor engage in one in person or by an attorney but must appear by a guardian, a guardian ad litem or a next friend. (Waechter v. Industrial Com., 11 N.E.2d 378 (Ill. 1937) supra; Walgreen Co. v. Industrial Com. 323 Ill. 194 (Ill. 1926).

Where no guardian nor next friend of a minor appears, it is the duty of the court to appoint one, failure to do so is reversible error. (Skaggs v. Industrial Com., 371 Ill. 535, 542 (1939)) Referencing (Simpson v. Simpson, 273 Ill. 90; Millard v. Marmon, 116 id. 649.) 

Any action taken at law or in equity against the minor without such representation is voidable. (Skaggs v. Industrial Com., 371 Ill. 535, 542 (1939)) Referencing (White v. Kilmartin, 205 Ill. 525; Hall v. Davis, 44 id. 494.)

This holding is based on the well-settled rule of law that a minor cannot bring a legal proceeding nor engage in one in person or by an attorney but must appear by a guardian, a guardian ad litem or a next friend. (Skaggs v. Industrial Com., 371 Ill. 535, 542 (1939)) Referencing (Waechter v. Industrial Com. supra; Walgreen Co. v. Industrial Com. 323 Ill. 194.)

A party may petition the court to have a GAL appointed to represent the minor’s interests during the pendency of the case. 755 ILCS 5/11-5(a)

Not only will courts see that a guardian ad litem is appointed for the protection of rights of minors but will exercise constant supervision over such guardian ad litem to see that no interest of the minor or other person under legal disability is prejudiced. (Skaggs v. Industrial Com., 371 Ill. 535, 542 (1939)) Referencing (Gibbs v. Andrews, 299 Ill. 510)    

“A ‘next friend’ does not himself become a party to the habeas corpus action in which he participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest.”  Id. at 163, 110 S.Ct. 1717.  

A next friend “resembles an attorney, or a guardian ad litem, by whom a suit is brought or defended in behalf of another.”  Morgan v. Potter, 157 U.S. 195, 198, 15 S.Ct. 590, 39 L.Ed. 670 (1895).  

Beyond relational duties, the trial court has the power to accept the settlement and execute the documents here because minors were involved and affected by the outcome of the settlement proceedings. See (Skaggs v. Industrial Com., 371 Ill. 535, 542 (1939)

It is well established that the rights of minors are to be carefully guarded. See Villalobos v. Cicero School District 99, 362 Ill. App. 3d 704, 712 (2005); Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 570 (this is the public policy of Illinois)

When involved in any sort of litigation, a minor is deemed a ward of the court and the court "has a duty and broad discretion to protect the minor's interests." Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 570-71; accord In re Tyrese J., 376 Ill. App. 3d 689, 703 (2007)

("[w]e hold that the circuit court has an obligation to intervene when a minor's representative fails to protect his interests"); First National Bank of LaGrange v. Lowrey, 375 Ill. App. 3d 181, 204 (2007).

This includes the duty to approve or reject any settlement agreement proposed on the minor's behalf. See LaGrange, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 204; Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 571.

Neither a guardian of the minor's estate, nor his next friend or court-appointed guardian, nor even his parents have any legal right to settle the minor's cause of action unless and until the court reviews the settlement and approves it. See Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 571 (none of these has any legal right to settle minor's cause; court review and  approval of a settlement reached, even by parent, is "mandatory"); accord Villalobos, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 712; Smith v. Smith, 358 Ill. App. 3d 790, 793 (2005); Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc., 316 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1027 (2000)

When the court believes settlement to be in the minor's best interest, it may order a guardian or conservator to effectuate the settlement. See LaGrange, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 204; Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 571

If that person refuses to carry out the settlement in contradiction to the court's determination, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to settle the case on the minor's behalf. See Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 571-73, citing Davis v. Mather, 309 Ill. 284 (1923)  

(appointing such when conservatrix of estate refused to follow court's best interest determination for involved minor), and Lyons v. Whittington, 109 Ill. App. 3d 197, 202 (1982)

(holding that courts have "authority to order the compromise of litigation involving minors when settlement is in the best interest of the minor"). Thus, concomitant with the general policy favoring compromise and settlement is the principle that, while any adult plaintiff can voluntarily reject a settlement no matter how advantageous, the same is not true in the case of minors. See Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 573

Rather, when a minor is involved, "the * * * court has a duty to prevent the rejection of settlement offers which in the minor's best interests should be accepted" and, should this impede upon the minor's guardian or parents' ability to control the direction of the case, then so be it. Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 573.

We further clarify that the court's authority to perform its duty in this regard extends only to those cases where the evidence demonstrates that compromise is in the best interest of the minor. See Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 573.    

Accordingly, the court is permitted to review the parties' positions and the wishes of the minor's parents, analyze their potential strengths and weaknesses, and estimate probabilities of liability and damage awards. See LaGrange, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 204; Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 573.  

Ultimately, "[w]hen the court has made such an examination and has determined that settlement, rather than the uncertainties of trial, is in, the best interest of the minor, and when that determination is supported by the record, it will be affirmed." Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 574, citing Matthews v. Doner, 292 Ill. 592 (1920) (appellate court will affirm such finding) (appellate court will affirm such finding), and Hudson v. Thies, 35 Ill. App. 2d 189 (1962) (decision of trial court to approve such settlement lies in its discretion and will not be overturned absent abuse). 

Thus, concomitant with the general policy favoring compromise and settlement is the principle that, while any adult plaintiff can voluntarily reject a settlement no matter how advantageous, the same is not true in the case of minors. See Ott, 273Ill. App. 3d at 573. Rather, when a minor is involved, "the *** court has a duty to prevent the rejection of settlement offers which in the minor's best interests should be accepted" and, should this impede upon the minor's guardian or parents' ability to control the direction of the case, then so be it. Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 573

In Illinois, every minor involved in litigation is a ward of the court. (Ott by Ott v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 273 Ill.App.3d 563, 570–71 (1st Dist. 1995) 

“Illinois has long recognized the tort of negligent entrustment.“ State Farm Fire Casualty Co. V. McGlawn (1980), 84 Ill. App.3d 107, 110, 404 N.E.2d 1122, 1124,

“There is a duty upon the owner to deny permission to another to drive his automobile for his own purposes when he knows such person is an incompetent or reckless driver or by the exercise of reasonable diligence he could have known of such incompetency or recklessness. (Bensman v. Reed (1939),299 Ill.App.531,20 N.E.2d 910)

One essential element of the negligent entrustment cause of action is that persons charged with liability have a superior right to control the property at issue. Umble v. Sandy McKie and Sons, Inc., 294 Ill. App. 3d 449 (1998). 

Will v. Northwestern Univ., 378 Ill. App.3d 280, 294 (1st Dist. 2007) / perhaps even more significant than these relational duties, the trial court had the power to accept the settlement and execute the documents here because minors were involved and affected by the outcome of the settlement proceedings. It is well established that the rights of minors are to be carefully guarded. See Villalobosv. Cicero School District 99, 362 Ill. App. 3d 704, 712 (2005); Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 570 (thisis the public policy of Illinois). When involved in any sort of litigation, a minor is deemed a ward of the court and the court "has a duty and broad discretion to protect the minor's interests." Ott,273 Ill. App. 3d at 570-71; accord In re Tyrese J., No. 1-07-1078, slip op. at 25 (September 21,2007) ("[w]e hold that the circuit court has an obligation to intervene when a minor's representative fails to protect his interests"); First National Bank of LaGrange v. Lowrey, 375 Ill. App. 3d 181, 204 (2007). This includes the duty to approve or reject any settlement agreement proposed on the minor's behalf. See LaGrange, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 204; Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at571. Neither a guardian of the minor's estate, nor his next friend or court-appointed guardian, nor even his parents have any legal right to settle the minor's cause of action unless and until the court reviews the settlement and approves it. See Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 571 (none of these has any legal right to settle minor's cause; court review and approval of a settlement reached, even by parent, is "mandatory"); accord Villalobos, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 712; Smith v. Smith, 358 Ill. App.3d 790, 793 (2005); Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc., 316 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1027 (2000).

When the court believes settlement to be in the minor's best interest, it may order a guardian or conservator to effectuate the settlement. See LaGrange, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 204; Ott,273 Ill. App. 3d at 571. If that person refuses to carry out the settlement in contradiction to the court's determination, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to settle the case on the minor's behalf. See Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 571-73, citing Davis v. Mather, 309 Ill. 284 (1923)(appointing such when conservatrix of estate refused to follow court's best interest determination for involved minor), and Lyons v. Whittington, 109 Ill. App. 3d 197, 202 (1982) (holding that courts have "authority to order the compromise of litigation involving minors when settlement is in the best interest of the minor"). Thus, concomitant with the general policy favoring compromise and settlement is the principle that, while any adult plaintiff can voluntarily reject a settlement no matter how advantageous, the same is not true in the case of minors. See Ott, 273Ill. App. 3d at 573. Rather, when a minor is involved, "the *** court has a duty to prevent the rejection of settlement offers which in the minor's best interests should be accepted" and, should this impede upon the minor's guardian or parents' ability to control the direction of the case, then so be it. Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 573. 

We further clarify that the court's authority to perform its duty in this regard extends only to those cases where the evidence demonstrates that compromise is in the best interest of the minor. See Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 573. Accordingly, the court is permitted to review the parties 'positions and the wishes of the minor's parents, analyze their potential strengths and weaknesses, and estimate probabilities of liability and damage awards. See LaGrange, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 204; Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 573. Ultimately, "[w]hen the court has made such an examination and has determined that settlement, rather than the uncertainties of trial, is in the best interest of the minor, and when that determination is supported by the record, it will be affirmed." Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 574, citing Matthews v. Doner, 292 Ill. 592 (1920) (appellate court will affirm such finding), and Hudson v. Thies, 35 Ill. App. 2d 189 (1962) (decision of trial court to approve such settlement lies in its discretion and will not be overturned absent abuse).

The court appointed a guardian ad litem on behalf of the minor, with instructions to review the discovery materials submitted in the cause and the proposed offer. In his report, the guardian ad litem concluded that, due to the risks of trial and the gamble they presented, acceptance of the offer was in the best interest of the minor. The court adopted the report, found the settlement to be in the best interest of the minor, and ordered the guardian ad litem to execute all necessary documents to settle the case, over the parents 'objections. See Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 565-70.

On appeal, the parents argued, in part, that the trial court improperly coerced settlement of the cause by removing control of the minor's case from their control as parents and guardians of the estate and, thus, deprived them of their right to trial. The Ott court held that the trial court's determination that the settlement as offered was in the best interest of the minor and its action of executing that settlement over the objection of the parents and guardians of the estate were proper exercises of its powers. See Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 574. In affirming the settlement as ordered, the Ott court reviewed the same principles we outlined above, specifically that, in the case of a minor, the trial court has a duty to prevent the rejection of settlement offers which in the minor's best interest should be accepted, regardless of whether this impedes upon the minor's parents or guardian of the estate's ability to control the cause and its resolution. See Ott, 273 Ill.App. 3d at 573. The Ott court then analyzed the evidence presented to determine whether it supported the trial court's conclusion that the settlement was in the minor's best interest. It noted that the court had reviewed all the parties' position, including the wishes of the parents, who had been appointed guardians of the estate, the guardian ad litem's report, important legal factors such as proof of causation, average jury verdicts in similar cases and the admitted sincerity of the parents to obtain the most compensation possible for the minor. See Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 574.

In light of the trial court's thorough examination, the Ott court concluded that its ultimate determination and actions in accepting the settlement on the estate's behalf were not an abuse of discretion. See Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 574.

In Illinois, every minor (“A minor is a person who has not attained the age of 18 years.” 755 ILCS 5/11-1”) involved in litigation is a ward of the court. (Ott by Ott v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 273 Ill.App.3d 563, 570–71 (1st Dist. 1995) As a matter of public policy, the rights of minors are generally guarded carefully, and courts have both a duty to protect the rights of minors, and broad discretion in exercising this role. (Id)

The court may also appoint a GAL on its own motion, and it has broad discretion to do so when it finds it to be in the best interests of the minor, (Id) or whenever the court is concerned that the minor’s interests are not adequately represented. (Id.; Stevenson, 144 Ill. 2d at 302)

Thus, a court will appoint a GAL when the interests of the minor and next friend are different, (Skaggs, 371 Ill. at 541–42) adverse, (Kroot v. Liberty Bank of Chicago,307 Ill.App.209, 214 (1st Dist. 1940)) or conflicting. (Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Strickland, 33 Ill.App.3d 52, 58 (1st Dist. 1975); In re Estate of Viehman, 47 Ill.App.2d 138, 149 (5th Dist. 1964))

“A ‘next friend’ does not himself become a party to the habeas corpus action in which he participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest.”  Id. at 163, 110 S.Ct. 1717.  

A next friend “resembles an attorney, or a guardian ad litem, by whom a suit is brought or defended in behalf of another.”  Morgan v. Potter, 157 U.S. 195, 198, 15 S.Ct. 590, 39 L.Ed. 670 (1895).

The availability of next friend status is, however, subject to significant limitations:  

First, a “next friend” must provide an adequate explanation-such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability-why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action.   Second, the “next friend” must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate, and it has been further suggested that a “next friend” must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest.    

The burden is on the “next friend” clearly to establish the propriety of his status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163-64, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (internal citations omitted).  

These “limitations on the ‘next friend’ doctrine are driven by the recognition that ‘[i]t was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be availed of, as matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves next friends.’ ”  Id. at 164, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (quoting United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir.1921)).

“A ‘next friend’ does not himself become a party to the habeas corpus action in which he participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest.” Id. at 163, 110 S.Ct. 1717.  

A next friend “resembles an attorney, or a guardian ad litem, by whom a suit is brought or defended in behalf of another.”  Morgan v. Potter, 157 U.S. 195, 198, 15 S.Ct. 590, 39 L.Ed. 670 (1895).

‘[i]t was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be availed of, as matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves next friends.’” Id. at 164, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (quoting United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir.1921)). 

Beyond relational duties, the trial court has the power to accept the settlement and execute the documents here because minors were involved and affected by the outcome of the settlement proceedings. See Skaggs v. Industrial Com., 371 Ill. 535,542 (1939)

It is well established that the rights of minors are to be carefully guarded. See Villalobos v. Cicero School District 99, 362 Ill. App. 3d 704, 712 (2005); Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 570 (this is the public policy of Illinois).  

When involved in any sort of litigation, a minor is deemed a ward of the court and the court "has a duty and broad discretion to protect the minor's interests." Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 570-71; accord In re Tyrese J., 376 Ill. App. 3d 689, 703 (2007) ("[w]e hold that the circuit court has an obligation to intervene when a minor's representative fails to protect his interests"); First National Bank of LaGrange v. Lowrey, 375 Ill. App. 3d 181, 204 (2007).  

This includes the duty to approve or reject any settlement agreement proposed on the minor's behalf. See LaGrange, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 204; Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 571.

Neither a guardian of the minor's estate, nor his next friend or court-appointed guardian, nor even his parents have any legal right to settle the minor's cause of action unless and until the court reviews the settlement and approves it. See Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 571 (none of these has any legal right to settle minor's cause; court review and  approval of a settlement reached, even by parent, is "mandatory"); accord Villalobos, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 712; Smith v. Smith, 358 Ill. App. 3d 790, 793 (2005); Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc., 316 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1027 (2000).

When the court believes settlement to be in the minor's best interest, it may order a guardian or conservator to effectuate the settlement. See LaGrange, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 204; Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 571.

If that person refuses to carry out the settlement in contradiction to the court's determination, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to settle the case on the minor's behalf. See Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 571-73, citing Davis v. Mather, 309 Ill. 284 (1923) (appointing such when conservatrix of estate refused to follow court's best interest determination for involved minor), and Lyons v. Whittington, 109 Ill. App. 3d 197, 202 (1982) (holding that courts have "authority to order the compromise of litigation involving minors when settlement is in the best interest of the minor"). Thus, concomitant with the general policy favoring compromise and settlement is the principle that, while any adult plaintiff can voluntarily reject a settlement no matter how advantageous, the same is not true in the case of minors. See Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 573.

Rather, when a minor is involved, "the * * * court has a duty to prevent the rejection of settlement offers which in the minor's best interests should be accepted" and, should this impede upon the minor's guardian or parents' ability to control the direction of the case, then so be it. Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 573.

We further clarify that the court's authority to perform its duty in this regard extends only to those cases where the evidence demonstrates that compromise is in the best interest of the minor. See Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 573.  

Accordingly, the court is permitted to review the parties' positions and the wishes of the minor's parents, analyze their potential strengths and weaknesses, and estimate probabilities of liability and damage awards. See LaGrange, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 204; Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 573.  

Ultimately, "[w]hen the court has made such an examination and has determined that settlement, rather than the uncertainties of trial, is in, the best interest of the minor, and when that determination is supported by the record, it will be affirmed." Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 574, citing Matthews v. Doner, 292 Ill. 592 (1920) (appellate court will affirm such finding), and Hudson v. Thies, 35 Ill. App. 2d 189 (1962) (decision of trial court to approve such settlement lies in its discretion and will not be overturned absent abuse).